The Origins of Meaning and the Nature of Speech Acts

The Origins of Meaning and the Nature of Speech Acts. A workshop with Mitchell Green

March 15th — 16th, 2018, University of Szczecin, Szczecin, Poland

The purpose of the workshop is to provide a platform for philosophers working in the areas of philosophy of language, pragmatics, and the theory of law to discuss issues connected with the origins of meaning and speech, the nature of speech acts, and the function of assertion. Our keynote speaker is Mitchell Green, a prominent philosopher of language who has studied these issues extensively.

Venue: Willa West-Ende, 70-478 Szczecin, Al. Wojska Polskiego 65, http://willawestende.pl/

Organizing Committee: Magdalena Reszka, Maciej Witek (Chair), Mateusz Włodarczyk

Contact: magdalena.reszka@whus.pl

Programme

Thursday, March 15th

09.30             Opening

09.45 – 10.30  Mitchell Green (University of Connecticut), Origins of Meaning [abstract]

10.30 – 11.00  coffee break

11.00 – 11.45  Marcin Matczak (University of Warsaw), Why reinvent the wheel? Millikan on Grice, natural and non-natural meaning

11.45 – 12.30  Michał Araszkiewicz (Jagiellonian University)Meaning and Authority [abstract]

12.30 – 13.15  Mateusz Włodarczyk (University of Szczecin), Organic meaning, minimal minds and the origins of human communication

13.15 – 14.30  lunch break

14.30 – 15.15  Mitchell Green (University of Connecticut), Speech Acts [abstract]

15.15 – 16.00  Jan Michel (Ruhr University of Bochum), Extending declaratives [abstract]

Friday, March 16th

09.30 – 10.15  Mitchell Green (University of Connecticut), Assertion [abstract]

10.15 – 11.00  Maciej Witek (University of Szczecin), From acts of communication to assertions. Expressive norms and conventional patterns in the evolution of speech [abstract] [presentation]

11.00 – 11.30  coffee break

11.30 – 12.15  Paolo Labinaz (University of Trieste), Assertion, pattern recognition and epistemic vigilance [abstract]

12.15 – 13.00  Felix Bräuer (Humboldt University of Berlin), Assertion, Common Ground and Epistemic Injustice [abstract]

13.00 – 13.45  Neri Marsili (University of Sheffield), Assertoric commitment [abstract]

13.45             Closing