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**Implicatures and Conventions in Insinuation.
An Austinian Approach**

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‘Speech and Normativity’ Workshop, Cambridge, 15-16 May 2024

Insinuation is ‘the communication of beliefs, requests, and other attitudes ‘off-record’, so that the speaker’s main communicative point remains unstated.’
(Camp 2018: 42)

(*idea*₁) the communicative nature of insinuation

→ *overt* intentions (Camp 2018; Oswald 2022)

(*idea*₂) the off-record status of insinuation

→ no *unambiguously attributable* intention (Brown and Levinson 1987)

→ *nonavowable* intentions (Strawson 1964)

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The Gricean speaker ‘has a motive, inseparable from the nature of [their] act, for making [their communicative] intention clear.’ (Strawson 1964: 450)

The insinuator is unwilling to admit having intended to convey the content of their utterance; when challenged, they are prepared to coherently deny such an intention.

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In sum

Reconciling (*idea*₁) and (*idea*₂) within the Gricean framework appears to present a significant conceptual puzzle.

Assumption

The colloquial concept of insinuation fails to denote a homogenous class of phenomena; theorising about insinuation requires conceptual engineering (Chalmers 2020).

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Aim

To develop two concepts — *Gricean insinuation* and *Austinian insinuation* — and use them to address different aspects of the communicative practice of insinuation.

Gricean insinuation is a partially overt and partially covert act.

Austinian insinuation is a **procedure-governed** discursive practice involving **perlocutionary implicatures**.

Content

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*
2. *Conceptual preliminaries:
indirectness, cancellability and deniability*
3. *The concept of Austinian insinuation*
 - 3.1. Perlocutionary implicatures
 - 3.2. Procedure for insinuating
 - 3.3. Insinuated illocutions

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

Speeding Driver

- (1) a. I'm in a bit of a hurry.
b. Is there any way we can settle this right now? (Pinker 2007)
- (2) I will pay you 50 dollars and you will let me off the hook.

(1) >> (2)

Sober Captain

A captain of a sea ship writes in the ship's log:

- (3) The first-mate was drunk all day.

The following day, the first-mate takes a revenge by writing in the ship's log:

- (4) The captain was sober all day. (Fischer 1970; Bell 1997; Oswald 2022)
- (5) The captain is not normally sober.

(4) >> (5)

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

Gricean solutions

(*G_C*) insinuation as a covert act: ~ (*idea*₁) & (*idea*₂)

(Strawson 1964; Bach and Harnish 1979; Attardo 1999);

(*G_O*) insinuation as an overt act: (*idea*₁) & (*idea*₂)

(Fraser 2001; Camp 2018; Oswald 2022; Dinges and Zakkou 2023).

Non-Gricean solution

(*non-G*) insinuation as a speech act or a pragmatic act: (*idea*₁) & (*idea*₂)

(Austin 1975; Bell 1997, cf. Mey 1993).

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(*G_C*) insinuation as a covert act

(Strawson 1964; Bach and Harnish 1979; Attardo 1999)

A covert act:

its successful performance requires that its underlying intention remains unrecognized.

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In uttering *u*, *S* covertly conveys *A* if *S* intends:

(*i*₁) to get *H* to entertain *A*,

(*i*₂') for *H* not to recognize (*i*₁).

→ *counter-intention*

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(*i*₂') for *H* not to recognize (*i*₁). → *counter-intention*

S's motive behind (*i*₂') is their desire to avoid responsibility for contributing *A* into the conversation and, consequently, to maintain plausible deniability.

→ We are only accountable for actions undertaken intentionally.

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

(Go) insinuation as an overt speech act

(Fraser 2001; Camp 2018; Oswald 2022; Dinges and Zakkou 2023).

Main ideas

Insinuating utterances are a form of *overt* communication;

insinuated contents are speaker-meant and conveyed through the mechanisms of *conversational implicatures* (Camp 2018) or *pragmatic implications* (Fraser 2001).

The “phenomenon of *implicature with deniability* lies at [the] core [of insinuation].”

(Camp 2018: 46)

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The “phenomenon of *implicature with deniability* lies at [the] core [of insinuation].”

(Camp 2018: 46)

In short

- (*idea*₁) is preserved in its Gricean interpretation;
- however, we still need to elucidate (*idea*₂).

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

Camp 2018

Both (a) the off-record status of the insinuator's communicative act and (b) its deniability are represented in the content of their communicative intention.

“(...) an insinuating speaker typically intends *H* to recognize their intention

[(a)] that *M(Q)* be off-record, and

[(b)] that they are prepared to deny having meant *M(Q)* if challenged.”

(Camp 2018: 55)

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Assumptions

- both *S* and *H* possess the concepts of *off-record communication* and *deniability*;
- intentions underlying insinuation can be formed and recognized only against the backdrop of a shared social practice of insinuating (→ Section 3).

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

Fraser 2001

The off-record status of insinuation is explained by reference to *extra-linguistic* norms and rules, such as those of law, morality, politics, etiquette, and politeness.

‘Of course, because of unwanted import the speaker may not want to take responsibility for the insinuation. Rejection of this responsibility is within the speaker’s ability. (...) It is an issue separate from that of the communicative status of an insinuation if, for political or other reasons, the speaker does [not] wish to be explicit and direct with the content of the insinuation and takes the implied route.’ (Fraser 2001: 330-331; cf. Oswald 2022: 162)

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→ **implicatures and pragmatic inferences are *cancellable***

→ **extra-linguistic norm**

Questions

(q₁) What is it for a communicative act to have the off-record status?

(q₂) What motivates *S* to go off-record in conveying a certain content?

1. *Existing solutions to the puzzle of insinuation*

(*non-G*) insinuation as a speech act or a pragmatic act

(Austin 1975; Bell 1997, cf. Mey 1993)

‘(...) to call (...) acts as innuendo ‘covert’ and ‘non-communicative’ is to underestimate the complexity of communication. (...) Pragmatic acts achieve their goals, i.e. influencing intended interactants in some predetermined way, *not* by getting them to recognize the speaker’s intent to produce those effects but by situating the act in a context such that the goals of the interaction in general are derivable.’ (Bell 1997: 40-41)

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In short

- pragmatic acts are, by definition, non-overt; hence, (*idea*₂) is preserved;
- (*idea*₁) is reinterpreted along non-Gricean lines.

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‘Now one point in passing: not all the things we do in this sort of line in fitting our particular utterance, say, into its context of discourse can be things that we can do by an explicit performative. For example, we cannot say ‘I imply that’, ‘I insinuate’, etc.’ (Austin 1975: 88)

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

Indirectness

Insinuation necessarily involves indirectness in that for every act of insinuating there is a certain illocutionary or at least locutionary act that functions as its *vehicle*.

The indirectness inherent in insinuation can, but does not necessarily have to be accounted for in terms of *conversational* implicatures.

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

Distinguish between

- (*DC*) diagnostic cancellation,
- (*CC*) conversational cancellation,
- (*CD*) conversational denial.

(*DC*) is a test available to a theoretician who wants to determine if a specific implication of an utterance merits description as a conversational implicature.

(*CC*) and (*CD*), in turn, are two discourse moves that can be performed by actual speakers in real dialogical settings; they impose different constraints on the discourse context in which they can be made and produce different effects.

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

(DC)

A *putative* or *potential* implicature $M(Q)$ of u can be appropriately cancelled if one can add the cancelling phrase ‘but I don’t mean to imply $M(Q)$ ’ without producing a semantic contradiction. (Sadock 1978: 290; Jaszczolt 2009; Zakkou 2018)

Garage

(6) A: a. I’m out of petrol.

B: b. There is a garage round the corner. (Grice 1975/1989)

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

(CC)

A move that affects the incremental process of discourse meaning construction.

It consists in juxtaposing, within a single utterance, (*a*) a sentence whose utterance can give rise to implicature $M(Q)$ and (*b*) an appropriate cancellation phrase.

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Closed Garage

- (7) A: a. I'm out of petrol.
B: b. There is a garage round the corner,
c. but it's closed.

Meeting a Woman

- (8) a. *X* is meeting a woman this evening
b. — his sister, in fact. (Geurts 2010)

The intent behind turns (7c) and (8b) is to *prevent* the addressee from deriving the *potential* implicatures of (7b) and (8a), respectively.

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

(*CD*)

Its appropriateness requires that *S* has been challenged by their interlocutor.

Sally and Harry

- (8) Sally: a. This is the third time this week that I have seen
John getting off the bus at the stop near Maria's place.
- Harry: b. Do you mean that John and Maria are having an affair?
- Sally: c. I don't intend to imply anything of that sort!
d. You said it, not me.

2. *Conceptual preliminaries*

Plausibility

contextually plausible deniability (Camp 2018; Oswald 2022; Mazarella 2023)

→ available reconstructed c' in which S can be taken to mean $M(Q)$ '

psychologically plausible deniability (Pinker et al. 2008; Oswald 2022)

→ a sincere perlocutionary act or at least not a bald-faced lie

epistemically plausible deniability (Dinges and Zakkau 2023)

→ a distribution of the burden of proof between S and H

3. *The concept of Austinian insinuation*


Austinian insinuation

Insinuating is a socially constituted communicative practice;

→ ‘socially constituted’ = governed by a socially-accepted procedure;


→ ‘communicative’ = involving perlocutionary implicatures.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*



(Green 2007: 100)

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→ *an overt scowl,*

e.g., a spontaneous scowl which is deliberately demonstrated and maintained;
S's anger is implicated;

but this *implicature* is *neither* conventional *nor* conversational.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Garage

(6) A: a. I'm out of petrol.

B: b. There is a garage round the corner.

(10) The garage is open and has petrol to sell.

→ a *conversational* implicature of (6b)

(11) A's goal is to fill her tank and A wants B to assist her in achieving this goal.

→ a *perlocutionary* implicature of (6a);

it coincides in content with the central perlocutionary goal behind (6a).

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(PCP) 'Cooperate in whatever goals the speaker may have in initiating a conversational exchange, including any non-linguistic, practical goal. (Or in other words, be a good Samaritan.)' (Attardo 1997: 766)

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Scotch

A, who is B's guest, is pointing at a bottle of scotch.

(12) A: a. Is that scotch over there?

B: b. Yes.

c. Help yourself. (Attardo 1997: 753)

Following Asher and Lascarides (2001, 2013):

— two goals of (12a): one linguistically specified, the other contextually determined;

— rhetorical cooperation *versus* Gricean cooperation.

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— B's (12b) is a locutionary (Attardo 1997)

or rhetorically (Asher and Lascarides 2013) cooperative move;

— B's (12c), in turn, is an act of perlocutionary cooperation.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

(SE) ‘Where *A* is an agent and *B* a cognitive, affective, or experiential state of a sort to which *A* can have introspective access, *A* **express** her *B* if and only if *A* is in a state *B*, and some action or behaviour of *A*’s both **shows** and **signals** her *B*.’
(Green 2007: 43).

Showing an item = making it *epistemically accessible*
to an appropriately endowed and situated observer.

A **signal** is ‘any feature of an entity that conveys information (including misinformation) and that was **designed** for its ability to convey that information.’
(Green 2007: 49; cf. 2009: 150)

Designed = selected for *or* intentionally planned.

In short, **expressing** is a form of *designed showing*.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

- (PI₁) In uttering *u*, *S* perlocutionarily implicates *p* only if
- (a) *S* situates *u* in discourse context *c*, thereby *showing* *p* as the central perlocutionary goal behind *u*, and
 - (b) *S* intends to show *p* as the perlocutionary goal behind *u* — *S* refrains from concealing what *u* shows through its placement in *c* — thereby *signalling* her illocutionary goal *p*.

In short

We express perlocutionary goals behind our speech acts by deliberately situating them in specific contexts.

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- (PI₂) In uttering *u*, *S* perlocutionary implicates *p* if, and only if, *S* intends:
- (i₁) to get *H* to recognize that the perlocutionary goal behind *u* is *p*,
 - (i₂) to get *H* to recognize (i₁),
 - (i₃) that the fulfilment of (i₂) function as *H*'s reason for his recognition of *p* as the perlocutionary goal behind *u*,
 - (i₄) to get *H* to recognize (i₂)

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 - (i₂) to get *H* to recognize (i₁),
 - (i₃) that the fulfilment of (i₂) function as *H*'s reason for his recognition of *p* as the perlocutionary goal behind *u*,
 - (i₄) to get *H* to recognize (i₂)

Why should we prefer (PI₁) over (PI₂)?

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

[!₁] *PIs* are forms of non-overt communication.

[!₂] The same speech act, when situated in different contexts, can lead to different *PIs*.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

[!1] *PIs* are forms of non-overt communication.

[!2] The same speech act, when situated in different contexts, can lead to different *PIs*.

Piccadilly Circus

A is standing on Regent Street, and is approached by *B*.

(14) *A*: a. How long does it take by taxi to Piccadilly Circus?

B: b. You don't need a taxi — it's only a two-minute walk.

b'. One minute.

(Kempson 1975: 163; Attardo 1997: 761)

*c*₁ — *A* is dressed in tourist attire, holds a guidebook to London, appears nervous and is visibly in a hurry.

*c*₂ — *A* is using crutches and appears visibly tired.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

[!3] By situating their speech in a specific discourse context, *S* makes their implicated perlocutionary goal recognizable to any *competent interlocutor* — that is, to anyone who can arrive at an appropriate *subjective construal* of this context and its constituent *affordances*.

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Situational construals are ‘individual, group, and societal constructions of social meanings’ (Griffin and Ross 1991: 334).

Subjective construal is a ‘process of making sense of situations (...) and the people, objects, and events that occur within them’ (Lieberman 2022: 831);

our subjective construals of a certain situation are our personal understandings of its significance in terms of ‘what opportunities or actions it affords us’ (*Ibid.*: 832).

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Lieberman 2022:

- Any subjective construal is a form of seeing (visual, psychological, semantic);
- pre-reflective *versus* reflective subjective construals.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Hypothesis

- There are two types of *PIs*: *standard* and *non-standard*;
 - understanding the former involves *pre-reflective* subjective construal, while interpreting the latter requires *reflective* subjective construal.
- Levinson (1983: 104-109) on standard / non-standard conversational implicatures

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Hypothesis

- There are two types of *PIs*: *standard* and *non-standard*;
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→ Levinson (1983: 104-109) on standard / non-standard conversational implicatures

Standard *PIs* are conveyed by aligning certain speech acts and their perlocutionary goals with what is afforded by the situations in which these acts are performed;

→ *Garage, Scotch, Piccadilly Circus*

non-standard *PIs*, in contrast, are conveyed through producing *breaks* (→ Bell 1997) and *incongruities* in the situations in which they are formed.

→ *Speeding Driver, Sober Captain*

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Speeding Driver

- (1) a. I'm in a bit of a hurry.
- b. Is there any way we can settle this right now?

Sober Captain

A captain of a sea ship writes in the ship's log:

- (3) The first-mate was drunk all day.

The following day, the first-mate takes a revenge by writing in the ship's log:

- (4) The captain was sober all day.

[!4] (1) and (4) are 'breaks in the frame' (Bell 1997: 57);
they are not aligned with what the situations in question
afford their participants in thought, speech, and action.

3.1. *Perlocutionary implicatures*

Tony and His Axe

Tony is walking around a plant nursery, intending to buy an axe and pesticide. At some point, he notices Mr. Piocosta.

- (15) T.: Mr. Piocosta, right? How are you doing?
You remember our boys? Went to camp Aheka together.
- P.: Of course, Tony, how are you?
- T.: Good, good. **Your kid still got that killer crossover dribble?**
- P.: Yeah, I guess so.
- T.: (raising his hand in which he holds an axe)
That's gonna get him a scholarship.
- P.: So how's Anthony?
- T.: He's moody, you know, for a kid that age, you know.
- P.: Well, it was nice seeing you, Tony.¹

¹ "The Sopranos", season 1, episode 4 "Meadowlands", directed by John Patteson, written by Jason Cahill.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

‘(...) *insinuating*, as when we insinuate something in or by issuing some utterance, seems to involve some convention, as in the illocutionary speech act; but we cannot *say* ‘I insinuate ...’, and it seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a mere act.’ (Austin 1975: 105)

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

‘Austin does not present [rules A, B, and Γ] as (templates for) jointly sufficient conditions, but leaves the performance of illocutionary act tokens open to unforeseen forms of defeasibility. Thus, one of the main differences between his speech act theory and Searle’s resides in the alleged completeness of the Serlean set of rules as opposed to the advertised incompleteness of that of Austin.’ (Sbisà 2019: 26)

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In sum

— Austinian procedures are open-ended structures of affordances.

Invoking a specific procedure in a certain situation means imposing predictable and mutually recognizable constraints on what the participants in this situation can afford in speech, thought, and action.

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In sum

— Austinian procedures are open-ended structures of affordances.

Invoking a specific procedure in a certain situation means imposing predictable and mutually recognizable constraints on what the participants in this situation can afford in speech, thought, and action.

— Nevertheless, we can represent some aspects of the procedure as felicity conditions.

→ Austinian *approach* & Serlean *method*

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

‘Austin does not present [rules A, B, and Γ] as (templates for) jointly sufficient conditions, but leaves the performance of illocutionary act tokens open to unforeseen forms of defeasibility. Thus, one of the main differences between his speech act theory and Searle’s resides in the alleged completeness of the Serlean set of rules as opposed to the advertised incompleteness of that of Austin.’ (Sbisà 2019: 26)

In sum

— Austinian procedures are open-ended structures of affordances.

Invoking a specific procedure in a certain situation means imposing predictable and mutually recognizable constraints on what the participants in this situation can afford in speech, thought, and action.

— Nevertheless, we can represent some aspects of the procedure as felicity conditions.

→ Austinian *approach* & Serlean *method*

[!] Insinuating is a *pragmatic* act (Mey 2001);

its *pragmatic* force can be characterised by reference to its effects, that is, the way its performance affects its context.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Procedure for insinuating

Given that S utters u in the presence of H in context c ,
 S insinuates $M(Q)$ only if the following conditions obtain:

(Con₁) *Vehicle Condition*

In uttering u in c , S performs the act of F -ing that P .

(Con₂) *Perlocutionary Implicature Condition*

By situating the act of F -ing that P in c , S conveys perlocutionary implicature $M(Q)$.

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(Con₂) *Perlocutionary Implicature Condition*

By situating the act of *F*-ing that *P* in *c*, *S* conveys perlocutionary implicature *M(Q)*.

- The indirect nature of insinuation (→ an *implicature* and its *vehicle*);
- the implicature is either standard or non-standard
that is, it either fits the frame or constitutes a break in it.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

(Con₃) *Preparatory Condition*

For a certain reason, conveying $M(Q)$ explicitly is unwanted in c .

→ Fraser 2001.

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Hypothesis

(Con₃), in virtue of being a preparatory condition, can be accommodated or its accommodation can be blocked (→ acts of insinuating can be *defused*).

Sally and Harry'

- (8) Sally: a. This is the third time this week that I have seen
John getting off the bus at the stop near Maria's place.
- Harry: b. You can put it bluntly.
c. There is nothing wrong with them having an affair.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Four 'Essential' Conditions

(Con₄) *Perlocutionary Effect Condition*

By implicating $M(Q)$, S intends to bring about a corresponding change in the set of beliefs *merely* shared by S & H .

→ Lee and Pinker (2010: 796) on *mere shared individual knowledge* (MSIK)

→ MSIK \neq CG (MB)

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Four 'Essential' Conditions

(Con₅) Conversational Responsibility Condition

By implicating $M(Q)$, S attempts to shift responsibility onto H for introducing $M(Q)$ into the conversation. (Camp 2018)

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Four 'Essential' Conditions

(Con₅) Conversational Responsibility Condition

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Sally and Harry

- (8) Sally: a. This is the third time this week that I have seen
John getting off the bus at the stop near Maria's place.
- Harry: b. Do you mean that John and Maria are having an affair?
- Sally: c. I don't intend to imply anything of that sort!
d. You said it, not me.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Four 'Essential' Conditions

(Con₆) *Epistemic Effect Condition*

By implicating $M(Q)$, S puts H in an epistemically demanding position.

→ deniability;

→ the burden of proof (see Bell 1997: 36, 53-54; Dinges and Zakkou 2023).

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

Four 'Essential' Conditions

(Con₇) *Staining Effect Condition*

By implicating $M(Q)$, S puts a stain on the reputation of her target (not necessarily H).

- Bell 1997 and Fraser 2001 on the staining effect;
erasing the stain *versus* denying having conveyed $M(Q)$
- a *stigma* (Goffman 1963; Hacking 2004) as a particularly pernicious stain.

3.2. *The procedure for insinuating*

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Obama's Middle Name (Camp 2018: 42)

- (16) a. You know that Obama's middle name is Hussein.
b. I'm just saying.

(16b) is an attempt to cancel the perlocutionary implicature of (16a).

3.3. Insinuated illocutions

Question

- Can one perform an indirect illocutionary act at the level of what is insinuated?
- Are there utterances that have the pragmatic force of insinuating and, at the same time, a certain indirect illocutionary force?

3.3. Insinuated illocutions

Speeding Driver

- (1) a. I'm in a bit of a hurry.
 - b. Is there any way we can settle this right now? (Pinker 2007)
- (2) I will pay you 50 dollars and you will let me off the hook.

- The driver's utterance of (1) constitutes a 'break in the frame', thereby conveying a certain perlocutionary implicature;
- does (1), by virtue of implicating (2), take effect as an indirect illocutionary act of offering a bribe?

3.3. Insinuated illocutions

Speeding Driver

- (1)
 - a. I'm in a bit of a hurry.
 - b. Is there any way we can settle this right now? (Pinker 2007)
- (2) I will pay you 50 dollars and you will let me off the hook.

- As an act of insinuating, (1) presupposes that offering a bribe in this context is unwanted [$\rightarrow (Con_3)$]; it is unwanted and risky because the officer stands in relation R_1 to the driver.
- As an indirect act of offering a bribe, (1) presupposes that the officer and the driver stand in relation R_2 to each other.

3.3. Insinuated illocutions

Hypotheses

- (H_1) There are two levels of the interaction between the driver and the officer:
— the official level (\rightarrow relation R_1 , the ‘officer-driver interaction’ frame);
— the non-official level (\rightarrow relation R_2 , the ‘business negotiation’ frame).
- (H_2) By uttering (1), the driver performs an act of *entreating* (\rightarrow Kukla 2014), that is, an act that counts as an attempt to enter a discursive subspace where certain acts are affordable and appropriate. Specifically, it aims to establish relationship R_2 with the officer, within which offering and negotiating a bribe is appropriate.
- (H_3) This act requires the officer’s uptake for its success;
this uptake is manifested at the level of what is insinuated.
- (H_4) Relation R_2 is parasitic on relation R_1 ;
the former neither replaces nor suspends the latter.

3.3. Insinuated illocutions

Tacit Negotiation

(17) *D*: a. I'm in a bit of a hurry.

b. Is there any way we can settle this right now?

O: c. Well, we have a special holiday fund for police officers' children.

D: d. I would be glad to contribute to that.

O: e. That could work.

D: f. What's the usual contribution?

O: g. Most people donate around 60 dollars.

D: h. I have only 45 on me right now.

O: i. That's perfectly fine.

In summary

[1] Following Bell (1997: 46), Fraser (2001), and Camp (2018), I account for the indirect nature of insinuating speech in terms of *implicatures*. However, in my view, the *implicatures* involved in insinuating are *perlocutionary* rather than *conversational*.

[2] Like Bach and Harnish (1979), Strawson (1964), and Attardo (1999), I consider insinuation to be a non-overt act. However, acknowledging this does not mean embracing the view that insinuation is a covert speech act.

[3] Following Fraser (2001), I assume that the adoption of an off-record communicative strategy is motivated and justified by extra-linguistic rules. However, I claim that referring to these rules forms part of a socially accepted procedure for insinuation.

[4] Like Camp (2018), I assume that participants in a successful instance of insinuation, must possess the concepts of off-record communication and deniability. However, my hypothesis is that their possession of these concepts manifests through their mutual acceptance of a procedure for insinuating.

THANK YOU

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