Expressing the Self: From Types of *De Se* to Speech-Act Types[1]

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1. Introduction

When we think of problems posed by attitudes *de se* we normally think of the difference between what we want to consider to be their pure semantic content and the specific characteristics that many wish to exclude from this content, namely their essential property of self-reference, associated with self-awareness, self-attribution of properties, self-ascription performed in the act of assertion, the act of self-referring, and so forth. Ever since the seminal formulations of various aspects of the problem and the vintage solutions offered by Perry (1979), Lewis (1979a), Kaplan (1989a, b) and Stalnaker (1978) among others, the discussion has largely focused on what ought to count as the content of such beliefs and on finding the true locus of the essential property of self-reference (see also Perry, this volume). Hybrid accounts followed suit. Recanati (2012a, 2016) combines centred worlds with belief states and locates indexicality in metarepresentation: the hearer forms a mental file with the content of the speaker's utterance and represents it 'indexically', so to speak, as the speaker's self-ascription.[2] Next, we have a group of approaches according to which indexicality fits in a more general theory of presupposition (e.g. Zeevat 1999; Maier 2009, 2016; Hunter 2015). The discussion continues and gathers momentum when orthogonal questions such as that of the existence of a unique, shared, intended and recovered thought, and when ascertained, its mutual availability to the interlocutors, are open for discussion.

This paper is mostly about the semantics of *linguistic expressions* of beliefs *de se*, and only derivatively about the beliefs themselves. We ask what should these representations contain and offer a radically contextualist answer. Using novel as well as extent data, we argue that, *pace* some extant proposals, there is no evidence that natural languages use

[2] In this context see also e.g. Perry 2012 and Stalnaker 2016.

different kinds of expressions for externalizing different types or aspects of self-reference, self-portrayal of the self. Neither is there evidence, *pace* some extant studies, that there are linguistic expressions that are uniquely designated for expressing degrees of detachment from the self and as such degrees of speaker-based generalization (see also Huang, this volume and Huang, Srioutai and Gréaux, this volume). All there is, we claim, is a context-dependent choice of strategy for expressing the self in discourse, which depends as much on the conventions of language use as on the type of the speech act performed, the speaker's primary goal in speaking, the role she plays at the current stage of a language game, and other socio-pragmatic factors characterising the speech situation the speaker finds herself in. We assess new evidence from Polish which agrees with recent studies on English, French and Thai in putting into question the view of a correlation between the type of self-referring expression and the type or aspect of the *de se* thought expressed, and in particular the view that impersonal grammatical forms and expressions stand for self-reference that is generalised to others. After rejecting the thesis of a correlation between types of expressions and types or aspects of *de se* thought, we argue in favour of a functionalist, speech-act based account and demonstrate its superiority over approaches that focus on formal semantic properties of indexical expressions such as versions of two-dimensional semantics (Kaplan 1989a, b; Stalnaker 1978) that treat indexicals as a separate semantic category, as well as other philosophical approaches that relegate the *de se* perspective to a construct outside the proper semantic content such as Perry's (1979) roles or, recently, Recanati's (2012a, 2016) indexed self-files. This makes our approach compatible with a range of approaches that depart in various ways from the standard semantics of indexicals in favour of more discourse-based solutions such as de Schepper's (2015) emphasis on participants' roles in speech acts over the grammatical category of the person, Mount's (2015) proposal that pure indexicals such as 'I' refer to mutually accepted perspectives in discourse, and the supporters of a presuppositional account of indexicals mentioned above.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly introduce expressions of *de se* thoughts and discuss the main theoretical problems they pose for a theory of meaning. In Section 3 we attend to the methodological issue of evidence and argumentation that are used to shed light on the representation of *de se* meaning and move to the justification of a speech-act based account of self-reference and in particular to the justification of the methodological path 'from *de se* expression to *de se* thought'. In Section 4 we introduce our empirical study based on a purpose-made questionnaire through which we tested the thesis of a correlation between types of expressions and types and degrees of self-

reference with respect to *speaker-based generalization* and *immunity to error through misidentification*. We present the questionnaire design, introduce the experiment, and present and discuss the findings, concluding that there is no observable correlation between categories of expressions and (a) the presence or absence of generalization or (b) the presence or absence of immunity to error through misidentification. We also go further and suggest, on the basis of our data and our theoretical argumentation, that there is no correlation between aspects of *de se* thought *tout court* and categories of expressions used for their expression. Next, we tentatively put forth a hypothesis according to which the speaker motivates her choice of strategy for expressing the self by discourse-internal considerations the type of the speech act she intends to perform, the primary goal behind her utterance, the discourse role she undertakes at the current stage of the exchange, as well as other socio-pragmatic factors, including the reliance on conventions. Next, we further motivate the speech-act-based account of *de se* thought and suggest that a classification, if any, would have to be based on aspects of *de se* foregrounded in, and crucial to the success of, the particular act of communication. For example, successfully blaming someone requires foregrounding different aspects of the self from successful advertising of a product. We conclude in Section 5 that pegging a thought on the notion of the self is part and parcel of the speech act performed, be it an assertion, a request, or any other goal-directed linguistic performance, and as such ought not to be separated from the representation of meaning. Using at this point our theoretical assumption of radical contextualism, we also propose that the *de se* perspective ought to constitute part and parcel of the semantic content *per se*, albeit pointing out that the scope of what one wishes to call 'semantics' is up for grabs and detachable from our core argument.

2. *De Se* Thoughts: Meaning and Communication

There are several seminal examples populating the philosophical and linguistic literature that focus on the importance that self-reference brings to the perception of an eventuality. Looking at a person who is in danger of catching fire engenders different reaction from realising that one's own trousers are about to catch fire (Kaplan 1989a); thinking about a shopper who is making a mess with a torn bag of sugar in his trolley engenders a different reaction from realising that one's own bag of sugar is making that mess (Perry 1979); reading a description of someone's heroic deeds engenders a different reaction from realising that the text is about the reader himself, and so forth.

Representing the content of *de se utterances* — i.e., utterances that involve referring to oneself *qua* the self — poses a problem for a theory of meaning. Using Perry's (1979) supermarket shopper scenario, the vintage problem has been to account for the fact that, although the semantic content of (1a) and (1b) is allegedly the same, namely (1c), there is clearly an important difference between the meaning of (1a) and (1b).

(1a)   That man with the torn bag is making a mess.

(1b)   I am making a mess.

(1c)   λx [make-a-mess (x)] (john perry)

The assumption that the semantic content is exhausted by (1c) is founded on the theoretical claim that personal and demonstrative pronouns are devices of direct reference: their role is exhausted in providing a referent. Equally, in context, and with suitable contextualist assumptions, the referential use of a definite description as in (1d) will yield that semantic content.

(1d)   The man with the torn bag is making a mess.

But it is only (1b) that *unambiguously expresses* a belief *de se*. One can suppose, therefore, that 'I' is semantically specified for conveying self-reference in discourse or, in other words, that this function is part and parcel of its linguistically specified meaning. Utterances of (1a) and (1d), by contrast, normally express beliefs *de re* which, although objectively speaking can be described as *de re about oneself*, turn into beliefs *de se* only with further evidence becoming available. The question arises, then, as to how to represent the *de se* perspective as part of the meaning of (1b) – and, of course, where to locate it.

Now, keeping the semantic content simple for the purpose of facilitating a formal account of meaning has led to a plethora of rather problematic, cognitively implausible solutions. Instead, we will start by looking at an external motivation for carving the field in such a way as to focus on indexical, and as such directly referential, expressions as a category.

To begin with, first-person pronoun can be used non-indexically. For example, it can have a bound-variable interpretation as in Kratzer's (2009) example (2) or can, so to speak, refer to the Kaplanian character as in (3).

(2)   *I*'m the only one around here who can take care of *my* children.

(3)   With these people it is always *me, me, me*.

On the other hand, non-indexicals can have indexical uses, as for example 'mummy' in child-directed speech, proper names in child speech, or self-directed epithets 'the idiot here', 'muggins', and so forth (see e.g. Jaszczolt 2013a, b; Jaszczolt *this volume*). Next, languages make extensive use of impersonal forms such as English *one*, French *on* or German *man* or Polish impersonal reflexive *się* that are clearly entrenched in self-reference, but they can in addition serve other semantic or socio-pragmatic functions (see e.g. Moltmann 2006, 2010a, b; also Huang; Jaszczolt and Witek; Huang, Srioutai and Gréaux, all this volume). At this point it is clear that it would be an unjustified generalization to claim that there is a '*de se* phenomenon' that linguists and philosophers all attempt to solve. Instead, there is a whole range of more, or less, theory-internal questions that *de se* thoughts generate for linguists and for philosophers. As a result the object of research is carved in accordance with the choice of such research questions. If, say, in a Kaplanesque manner, direct reference and the clear indexical/nonindexical distinction are assumed, we proceed with an assumption that there is a clear separation between the content and what facilitates this content – a thought, a role, a mode of presentation, a character, centring of the possible worlds, indexing of a mental file, and so forth.[3] One then proceeds to discussing content in terms of propositions or properties (see also Perry, this volume), making further assumptions concerning whose meaning one ought to represent, the speaker's or the addressee's, and, more recently, what this tells us about the process of meaning recovery.

Bearing this history in mind, we will construe the field as follows. We will focus on various strategies — both lexical and contextual — speakers use to convey self-reference in discourse and will proceed *from discourse* de se *to* de se *thoughts*. Next, in contrast to direct reference theorists, we will understand indexicals in a pragmatics-infused way, allowing them to be *functions* rather than categories, in accordance with Jaszczolt (2016; *this volume*): just as the purpose of 'I' is to point to the speaker, so is the function of 'muggins' or 'daddy' in the relevant context. Since there is no difference in the path of recovering the referent in these cases, provided the contextual assumptions are assessed correctly to meet the addressee's needs, we will not see any need for adopting any category distinctions apart from function-

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[3] For the purpose of our current discussion, the fact that the listed solutions differ somewhat in the research questions they are addressing can be safely put aside.

triggered ones. But we will go further. The function of expressions used for self-reference, on both sides of the well-entrenched indexical/nonindexical distinction, is not always limited to indicating the referent. Using 'I', 'one', 'muggins', an arbitrary PRO construction, as well as a non-lexical, situational strategy for expressing the self, can be preferred in one context and dispreferred in another not because they communicate different aspects or types of *de se tout court*, but because the success of the speech act demands it. In making a *de se* utterance, the speaker uses various lexical or contextual strategies for presenting a certain perspective she takes on herself. More specifically, she foregrounds the role she plays at the current stage of the language game, thereby helping the audience recognize the type and primary goal of her speech act. Generally speaking, she facilitates the *securing of uptake* on the part of the audience — i.e., the achievement of 'the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution' (Austin 1975: 117) — which is a necessary condition for the successful performance and proper functioning of the act (for a discussion of this issue see Sbisà 2009; Witek 2013, 2015a).

In (4), the second sentence communicates an assertion describing what happened, combined with the self-evaluation of the speaker's gullibility.

(4)   *I* opened the email. It said that someone had been using *my* Paypal account and *I* had to click on the link and type in *my* password to let them sort it out. And *muggins* followed the instructions and lost quite a lot of money.

It is a matter of a theoretical assumption whether we wish to claim that (4a) and (4b) share the semantic content (4c). A contextualist is likely to include the value of the epithet in the content and opt for (4d).

(4a)   Muggins lost money.
(4b)   I lost money.
(4c)   λx [lost-money (x)] (kasia jaszczolt)
(4d)   λx [lost-money (x) ∧ gullible (x)] (kasia jaszczolt)

Clearly, *I* and *muggins* are not synonymous linguistic expressions; approached extra-theoretically and with a dose of common sense, the question favours the answer in (4d). What one has to sacrifice is a tidy formal account of reference. What one gains is an account of the

content of the act of communication as intended by its speaker, also formalizable in terms of truth-conditional theory if one so wishes.[4] In what follows we will focus on the latter, namely on the main content communicated by the speaker in a speech act that includes self-reference. Our main objective will be to gain more insight into what it is that we communicate when we communicate a *de se* thought: are there any generalizable aspects of *de se*, types of *de se* that one can discern from the choice of the expressions alone? We want to approach this question with the idea of discourse-constituted *de se* thoughts, which we present in more detail in Section 3. Roughly speaking, a discourse-constituted aspect of the self is the perspective the speaker takes on herself in performing her speech act and presents for the purposes of its successful performance. In our view, to repeat, the presentation of the perspective involves different lexical, grammatical and contextual strategies whose choice is motivated by a number of socio-pragmatic and discourse-internal factors such as the type of speech act, the primary goal behind the utterance, or the current role of the speaker.

In the remainder this section we consider two properties that can be ascribed to some *de se* thoughts — *immunity to error through misidentification* (Shoemaker 1968) and *generalizing detached self-reference* (Moltmann 2006, 2010a) — and consider whether they can serve as parameters for a potential classification of *de se* expressions. In particular, we examine critically the idea according to which natural languages offer different lexical and grammatical means that are semantically specified for expressing different types of *de se* thoughts, *e.g.*, *de se* thoughts immune to error through misidentification and *de se* thoughts that involve generalizing detached self-reference. The question of the association between aspects of *de se* and types of expressions will then be addressed empirically in Section 4.

Some thoughts are unmistakably and strongly *de se*: when I know I have a headache, I cannot by mistake think of someone else as myself. On the other hand, when I am convinced that I look at my reflection in the mirror and see that I missed a button in my blue jacket while in fact I am looking through a glass pane at someone who, at a distance, looks like me and is wearing a similar looking jacket, this feature of strong *de se* is not present. After Shoemaker (1968), we say that the first class displays immunity to error through misidentification (IEM).[5] In general, IEM is a property of a subset of *de se* thoughts in the case of which it is not possible that what is predicated of the referent is, unbeknownst to the speaker, in fact predicated of a third party. So, the immunity is present in the case of, say,

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[4] Post-Gricean contextualist approaches to meaning are truth-conditional theories, cf. Recanati's (2010) truth-conditional pragmatics, relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) or Jaszczolt's Default Semantics (2005).
[5] See the essays in Prosser and Recanati (2012) for some recent discussions.

proprioception, but not when the speaker looks at themselves, so to speak, from an external perspective.[6] In other words, '[t]o be immune, my thought must be grounded in introspection', or in 'a way of gaining information about one's mental states *from the inside*' (de Vignemont 2012: 224).

What we want to know before we advance our defence of the pragmatic perspective on the expression of *de se* (and before we start building it merely on intuitions) is whether IEM can be correlated with particular linguistic items or grammatical constructions. If it can, then the adequate explanation can rely on the categories of the language system alone. However, if IEM better correlates with situations, eventualities or speech acts rather than linguistic units, we will have an argument in support of the view that expression of *de se* phenomena calls for a pragmatic or functional analysis. At first glance, the language-system based correlation seems plausible: having a headache or pain in one's chest results in an assertion that is limited to a fairly small set of ways of expressing it (although our evidence from Polish advanced in Section 4 will reveal some motivations for choices in this domain). On the other hand, however, there also mixed cases as in (5).

(5)   I am wearing a blue jacket that scratches my back.

Altering our previous scenario somewhat, imagine that I am looking through a window pane at someone looking like me from a distance and wearing a blue woollen jacket that looks identical as the one I have and that is in fact now hanging in my wardrobe. At the same time I am experiencing itching in my back that I associate with wearing my blue jacket made of prickly wool. On this scenario it appears that *a part of my self-ascription* exhibits IEM: the part that refers to the itching sensation. We could argue that the linguistic structure of (5) allows for separating these two parts easily into, say (5a) and (5b) and it is only (5b) that poses the problem – an easy one to explain though as it is the case of a referential mistake.

(5a)   I am wearing a blue jacket.
(5b)   The blue jacket scratches my back.

But the version n (5c) is not as easy to unpack and *a fortiori* not as easy to use in an argument for the existence of two separate *de se* thoughts, one with IEM and one without.

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[6] See e.g. Recanati 2007, 2012b and Zeman, this volume. See also Aikhenvald, this volume on the use of non-visual evidentials to talk about one's own experiences in Arawak languages.

(5c)   I am wearing a blue, itchy jacket.[7]

It appears that adducing mental states and the corresponding speech acts as *explanantia* may be a more adequate way forward. The external perspective on the self (–IEM) and seeing oneself 'from the inside' (+IEM) correspond to very different mental states and these, by the definitional characteristic of intentionality, correlate with their externalisations in the form of speech acts.

Let us explain. Searle (1983: 27-28; 165-166) argues that linguistic expressions themselves do not exhibit intentionality; it is the mind that imposes on them the property of being *about* something, being aimed at something. Acts of communication exhibit an intention to represent, in which speaker's meaning is located, and this intention reflects the intentionality of the mental correlate of this act. In other words, speech acts have *derived* intentionality, while their mental correlates (mental acts) have *intrinsic* intentionality:

> 'There is a *double level of Intentionality*[8] in the performance of the speech act. (…)
> The mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by
> intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological
> state upon the external physical entity. The double level of Intentionality in the speech
> act can be described by saying that by intentionally uttering something with a certain
> set of conditions of satisfaction, those that are specified by the essential condition for
> that speech act, I have made the utterance Intentional, and thus necessarily expressed
> the corresponding psychological state.'   Searle (1983: 27-28)

Alternatively, we can pursue a more traditional phenomenological explanation advanced in Jaszczolt (1999: 104-111) and inspired by Husserl (1900-01) according to which there is no inheritance of intentionality but instead we envisage linguistic expressions as one of the vehicles through which thoughts are externalised and which, as a result, participate in the

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[7] Another possible argument comes from autosuggestion. Imagine your lookalike observed through a window pane wearing what looks like your blue jacket is eating a slice of watermelon. While watching him, you are putting a piece of pineapple in your mouth without looking at what you are eating. Being persuaded that you are looking at your own reflection in the mirror, and allowing for some slips of attention, you may experience a confused gustatory sensation.

[8] Our emphasis.

very same intentionality as mental states (Husserl's mental acts) themselves.[9] The difference between these two explanations of the provenance of intentionality of speech acts is tangential to our current purpose. Suffice it to conclude that speech acts as correlates of mental states provide us with the tool to represent the difference between internally *de se* (+IEM) and externally *de se* (–IEM) thoughts that appears to be more reliable than any classification of relevant linguistic structures and expressions.

Now, the difference between +IEM and –IEM *de se* can be understood as a difference in the strength of *de se* or type of *de se*. We pursue this question further in Sections 3 and 5, arguing that any plausible classification will have to be founded on the properties of mental states gleaned from the *speech acts* that externalise them rather than on the properties of linguistic categories. Our claim is compatible with Cappelen and Dever's (2013) argument that IEM is not inherently connected with indexicality, and in turn indexicality is not deeply associated with the self: perspectival thought it merely an inescapable constraint on our representation of the world. [10] We shall not contribute to this debate here but suffice it to say that it demonstrates, for our purposes, that indexicality seems to be a category that requires a much broader context than merely an association with traditionally understood indexical expressions. From the linguistic perspective, it is a function; from the philosophical perspective, it is an epistemological constraint and, arguably, a metaphysical necessity.[11]

Analogously, the difference between predicating something about oneself *tout court* and predicating something about oneself by 'putting oneself in someone else's shoes', so to speak, for example in order to issue polite advice or criticism, can be construed as different types or degrees of *de se*. In other words, there is another parameter for a potential classification that pertains to the intention to 'go beyond the self', so to speak, and make generalizations of some kind or other. As we have briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, self-reference can also be achieved in English through implementing generic *one*, an arbitrary PRO construction, or generic *you*. Moltmann (2006, 2010a) considers these expressions to be vehicles of generalization beyond the self. In (6), the speaker is likely to be conveying general advice on polite behaviour.

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[9] See also Husserl's later work (e.g. Husserl 1913) where he says that intentionality (orienting at an object) happens automatically to the experiencer. Note that in a recent proposal Azzouni (2013) goes all the way to proposing that humans perceive the meaning of linguistic expressions in the same way in which they perceive the meaning of objects and actions: directly, without the mediation of intentions.

[10] See also Recanati 2012b on implicit *de se* thoughts – thoughts where there is no reference to the self on the level of content but that are evaluated with respect to the thinker.

[11] The idea of functional indexicals is developed in Jaszczolt 2016, Chapter 5 and in Jaszczolt, *this volume*.

(6)   One wouldn't want to be seen as inquisitive.

Although considered sociolinguistically marked for the middle- and upper-class varieties these days – or, in general, for 'educated discourse' (Wales 1996: 82-83)[12], to some theoreticians this impersonal form stands for what Moltmann calls generalizing detached self-reference. But it is rather difficult to pinpoint what exactly this generalization consists of and in what exact aspects of its meaning and use *one* differs from *I*. We will return to this question, approaching it theoretically as well as empirically, throughout this paper.

Wales (1996: 71) points out that from the 18th century *I* has begun to acquire a symbolic meaning associated with the self that is best captured by its use as a noun preceded by the definite article: 'the I', as a signifier of the self, with all the connotations associated with the symbol. At the same time, *you* was used in monologues to refer to the self. An example she propounds here is that of Stephen Dedalus' self-referring inner speech in James Joyce's *Ulysses*.[13] So, on one hand we have a progressing symbolization of the *I* and losing ground to forms such as *one* or *we*, and on the other, the fact that there is no bi-unique mapping between the pronoun and the self-referring function: we can also alternate them in inner speech. *One*, she points out, has developed from the Old English adjective meaning 'a certain' and acquired its generic meaning in the 15th century as a replacement for the Old English *man*, meaning 'a certain person' or 'someone'. Its generic function has never been very stable, either as far as the distribution across sociolects is concerned or in the exact semantic content. Despite attempts such as Moltmann's to fit it into the mould of 'putting oneself in someone else's shoes', or more formally 'generalizing detached self-reference', it seems to be used more freely and associate better with socio-pragmatic and other contextual than semantic factors. Similar analysis is advanced for generic *you* and uncontrolled (arbitrary) PRO constructions as in (7) and (8).

(7)   To get to Oxbridge, you have to have at least A*AA in your A-levels.

(8)   It is difficult not to notice his stilted speech.

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[12] '…throughout its history *one*, unlike other pronouns, seems never to have been universally adopted in English: particularly associated with educated discourse, in each of its main areas of usage it is but one of a series of stylistic and also sociolinguistic alternatives, from the passive, to *we* and *you*, and to *I*.' Wales (1996: 83)

[13] See Wales 1996, p. 72.

Moltmann advances a theory of simulation and pretend self-attribution of properties to explain this generalized reference. But Wales' historical as well as synchronic account seems to show that such a view on the semantic function of *one* is somewhat too narrow. Moreover, there is new empirical evidence to support the observation that *one* behaves much more freely than the generalizing detached self-reference suggests. Huang (this volume) tested experimentally the behaviour of generic *one*, arbitrary PRO and generic *you*, concluding that the generic reading is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the use of generic *one*, *you*, or arbitrary PRO in discourse. If there is any regularity, then it seems to be an association with the *at-issue* content (Jaszczolt and Huang 2016). Similar lack of correlation has been observed for French and Thai (see Huang, Srioutai and Gréaux, *this volume*), although (i) the socio-pragmatic constraints on the French *on* are much weaker than those governing the English *one* and as a result the entire system of self-referring constructions is rather different in French, and (ii) the inventory of forms is somewhat different in Thai. Our questionnaire-based study of self-referring forms in Polish discussed in Section 4 yields analogous results through using a slightly different experimental method. In addition, Polish data also includes evidence from reporting on +IEM thoughts which further strengthens the hypothesis that it is the speech act rather than linguistic expression that we have to focus on in attempting any general explanations.

Next, Wales (1996: 69) observes that *I* regularly enters constructions in which its principal meaning is that of the second person, with the tacit 'If I were you I would…' as in (9), or even more explicitly in (10) and (11) where *I* is followed by second person reflexive or possessive pronoun.

(9)   I should ring them up (= You should ring them up, from *The Survey of English Usage*)

(10)   I should think yourself lucky.

(11)   I should wipe your feet.

As she says, '…the apparent "surface" anomaly between subject and reflexive and possessive reflects the "underlying" agency (…) of a "you", as well as the general addressee perspective' (Wales 1996: 69).

To conclude, putting together the fact of the unwieldy behaviour of generic *one* and the diversity of strength in self-centring with which *I* can be used discussed above with respect to ± IEM, we are left with no evidence in support of any correlation based on the

strength or type of self-reference. If there is a correlation, it is likely to be founded on the goals associated with the performance of a speech act, as well as on the discourse-constituted aspect of the self that the speaker presents and foregrounds in making her *de se* utterance. And it is the latter that is likely dictate any future typology.

One possible starting point is this. In pursuing the question of strengths, and possibly types, of self-referring one ought to ask about potential sources of classification of *de se*. We have discussed so far the internal (+IEM) and external (–IEM) thought, as well as the other-oriented generalization. These superimpose well onto Peacocke's (2014) three-way distinction between types of self-consciousness into (i) perspectival, containing objective thoughts about the self; (ii) reflective, standing for the awareness of one's mental states; and (iii) interpersonal, covering awareness that one is represented in other people's mental states. Concerning (i), knowledge that one has certain properties, and that one is like or unlike other people in this respect, has direct bearing on the issue of generalization discussed in the example of generic *one*, *you* and arbitrary PRO: it is this knowledge that allows us to issue advice, criticism, requests, and so forth. Category (ii) focuses on the psychological rather than social self but does not contribute to IEM in virtue of it; 'I remember paying the electricity bill' does not equal in this respect 'I remember (that) I paid the electricity bill' or 'I remember my paying the electricity bill'; IEM does not carry over from the first variant to the latter two in that one can misremember who the true agent was in this act.[14] The third category focuses on social interaction and as such on the reflection of the self in other people's third-person representations and beliefs. In other words, it covers my awareness that others construct an image of me based on information they gather from observation, conversations, third-person reports on me, and so forth. In other words, this is the awareness of the face (Goffman 1959), the public self-image. It may affect the choice of self-referring expressions as well as various non-lexical, situational strategies for expressing the self in order to foreground other-directedness as in the case of advice using generic *one* or *you*. Again, any classifications pertaining to this category are likely to be based on speech-act types, primary goals of the speakers and the roles they play in the interactional events under scrutiny.

All in all, we have argued here in favour of a reduction of the metaphysical to the discourse-pragmatic in that by looking at what aspects of *de se* are pertinent in discourse (rather than at the inventory of expressions and grammatical structures) we propose to shed

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[14] See Higginbotham 2003. Jaszczolt (2013b: 63) calls it 'attenuated *de se*'.

more light on the expressed *de se* thoughts themselves. In the next section we defend with more academic rigour our method of proceeding from expressions *de se* to *de se* thoughts in the order of explanation, which will provide us with a way of using these reductionist observations to strengthen the speech-act-based view.

3. Towards a Speech-Act Based Account of Expressions *De Se*: Methods and Theoretical Prerequisites

In a nutshell, the methodological direction we are pursuing in this paper is to argue from the expression of *de se* thoughts in discourse to the properties of the *de se* thought itself. As was discussed in Section 2, intentionality is the property that permeates both speech acts and the underlying mental states. As a sub-case, being *de se* permeates both the state and the expression of it. But, as we also argued in Section 2, language system alone does not give us sufficient insight into self-representation; instead we have to look at how the devices of the language system are employed in discourse, and part of it is to see how they work together with non-linguistic, situational means of expressing meaning. The direction *from expressing the self to* de se *thought* is employed both in the theoretical and in the empirical part of our enquiry. In the first, we will end up proposing the speech-act based approach to *de se*; in particular, we propose the idea of discourse-constituted *de se* thoughts construed as mental states one would not have if one did not externalize them by making corresponding *de se* utterances. The empirical part, pursued in Section 4, serves to dismiss the hypothesis of a correlation between expression types and two standardly recognised aspects of *de se* thought, namely generalization and IEM – in preparation for an improved proposal.

We employ theoretical argumentation that can be summarised in the following main steps:

1. There is no bi-unique correlation between categories of linguistic expressions and meanings in the case of self-reference (Section 2 and empirical evidence in Section 4); leads to 2:

2. Linguistic and non-linguistic means of communication combine in conveying intended meaning (a hypothesis from empirical evidence, Section 4); leads to 3:

3. Radical contextualism in the form of a speech-act based account ought to be adopted as a justified theoretical assumption (Sections 3 and 5);

prepares the ground for 4:

4. Self-reference in linguistic communication can shed light on the properties of the underlying *de se* thoughts (methodological assumption of this section);

enables an empirical enquiry leading to 5:

5. There are no clearly distinguishable types or degrees of *de se* thought. All there is is a discourse-constituted perspective that the speaker takes on herself and foregrounds — using various linguistic and situational means — to facilitate the successful performance of her speech act.

As we have indicated above, departing from 1 in the direction of 3 is in agreement with some other recent proposals such as Mount's (2015) who argues against Kaplan's fixity thesis whereby indexicals must acquire reference in the context of the current speech act and instead proposes that indexical reference is successful when the interlocutors' perspectives are mutually accepted. It also supports de Schepper's (2015) observation that while systems of grammatical person markers are language-specific, the participants' roles or a speech act allow for a universal theory and as such are preferable. Moving closer to formal accounts of indexicals, our speech-act based treatment falls broadly in the group of approaches that favour the view of indexicals as presuppositional, anaphoric expressions (e.g. van der Sandt 1992; Zeevat 1999; Maier 2009, 2016; Hunter 2013) in preference to awarding them a semantic status dramatically distinct from that of, say, common nouns as it is done in Kaplan's account where their content and character have essentially opposite characteristics.[15] On the other hand, our speech-act-based account takes a very different direction from that taken by linguists who make self-reference an inherent grammatical property of relevant pronouns ('I' for the speaker's *de se* thought and 'you' for the receiver's, see Wechsler 2010)[16] or part of Universal Grammar (Hinzen and Sheehan 2013)[17]. In general terms, it falls within the group of approaches that put into practice what Hawthorne and

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[15] The authors listed in this camp differ as to whether a two-dimensional account is still necessary in combination with the presupposition-based semantics. See Hunter 2013 for a discussion. Needless to say, our radically contextualist, function- and speech-act based approach questions a need for two-dimensional semantics, following the evidence discussed in Section 2.

[16] 'Only as a consequence of grammatically specified self-ascription can a pronoun be knowingly used to refer to a speaker or addressee.' Wechsler (2010: 349).

[17] 'If the grammar didn't operate on a given lexical concept, the concept would never become referential'. Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 119). Grammar comes with the concepts of TRUTH and the SELF (p. 336).

Manley (2013) aptly proclaim as the revised provenance of reference: reference belongs with the cognitive mechanisms and with thought rather than with a language system. *A fortiori*, we have singular thoughts but no singular linguistic units – a claim congenial to our discussion in Section 2.

To justify the methodological path 'from *de se* expression to *de se* thought', let us consider what it is for a speech act to externalise a thought and, in particular, what it is for a *de se* utterance to externalise a discourse-constituted *de se* thought. In a nutshell, we argue that the relation that holds between the externalised thought and the corresponding externalising utterance is internal rather than external; in other words, the externalised thought is produced *for* and *in the course of* speaking and as such shares with the externalising speech act the selected perspective on the self in that they are both derived from the same set of discourse-internal factors discussed above. More generally, we distinguish between (i) propositional attitudes expressed by speech acts and (ii) thoughts externalised in discourse. The former are studied by the proponents of the Gricean tradition in speech act theory (Bach and Harnish 1979; Harnish 2005; Green 2009; Kissine 2009), who take the attitude expressed by a speech act to play a key role in determining its force. By contrast, the approach we adopt in this paper focuses on discourse-constituted *de se* thoughts whose externalization involves presenting certain perspectives speakers take on themselves. In our view, the perspective presented by the speaker in making an utterance has a bearing on determining its goal and force. It is instructive to stress, however, that the perspective performs its force-determining function only in virtue of the fact that it corresponds to the speaker' role, which can be spelled out in terms of her collectively negotiated and agreed entitlement to perform certain illocutionary acts. According to the Austinian approach we adopt in this paper, the speaker's role or illocutionary power is constituted dynamically during the ongoing discourse; that is to say, it depends 'on some kind of practical (rather than cognitive) agreement among the relevant social participants' (Sbisà 2002: 230) or, in other words, is subject to a discursive processes of *interactional negotiation* between the speaker and the hearer, who 'come to an agreement about the definition of the situation they are in, as well as upon the definition of the situation they are talking about: it is a matter of jointly selecting one among several available frames, or of using and understanding contextualization cues' (Sbisà 2002: 230; for a discussion of the process of interactional negotiation see Witek 2015a: 14-15).

Let us start with the idea that in performing a speech act, the speaker usually presents a certain perspective she takes on herself, selecting it from among the set of possibilities

available for the speech situation she finds herself in. In other words, the speaker's position at a given stage of a language game is determined by a number of discourse-internal factors that correspond to potential perspectives she can take on herself and foregrounds in her *de se* utterance. In our view, the factors also correlate with different aspects or types of *de se* thoughts that can be ascribed to participants in the game. What is important here is the dynamic nature of this correlation: what we call *discourse-constituted* de se *thoughts* do not correlate with types of expressions taken in isolation but rather with, to repeat, the aspects of the self that are constituted within the progressing discourse. A key aspect of the discourse-constituted *de se* thought is the perspective that the speaker takes on herself in performing her speech act and presents using available linguistic and contextual strategies. Normally this perspective corresponds to the role she plays in the speech situation she finds herself in; for this reason, we call it a *discourse-constituted* or *role-bound* perspective on the self.

In our view, the mechanism of forming discourse-constituted *de se* thoughts can be likened to what Slobin (1996) aptly calls 'thinking *for* speaking': it results in the production of mental states whose mode of existence, so to speak, consists in being externalized *in* and *for the sake of* performing corresponding speech acts. As Stalnaker (2002: 711) puts it, '[t]here is nothing wrong, in general, with (…) expressing a belief that one would not have if one did not express it'. For example, in uttering sentence (12) to make an assertion Alice expresses her belief that it is common ground among her and her interlocutors that she has a sister, even though she had no belief to that effect before the time of this utterance.[18]

(12)   I have to pick up my sister from the airport.

What matters here is that using sentence (12) to assert that she has to pick up her sister from the airport, Alice initiates the mechanism of accommodation that results in updating common ground with the proposition that she has a sister. This update or adjustment makes her entitled to believe that it is common ground that she has a sister; what is more, it makes her utterance of sentence (12) an expression of such a belief. By analogy, we assume that there is nothing wrong with expressing a *de se* thought one would not have if one did not externalize it in making an appropriate *de se* utterance. Consider, for instance, a conversation between a faculty member and Peter, who is the Faculty Dean. Peter utters (13).

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[18] On this topic see also Tonhauser *et al.* 2013 on the taxonomy of projective content.

(13)   a. You will get a pay rise. b. You have the Dean's word for it.

In uttering (13b) Peter refers to himself. One can ask, however, why he uses the description 'the Dean' rather than the pronominal 'my'. It seems evident that in doing so Peter exploits and foregrounds his institutional role – or, more precisely, the institutional relationships that holds between him and his interlocutor – and thereby indicates the illocutionary force of his utterance. Specifically, it is natural to assume that the utterance under discussion is a promise. In virtue of being the dean, Peter is able to give the faculty member a rise. As the corollary of this, he is endowed with the illocutionary power to promise rises to faculty members. In short, in referring to himself by means of the description 'the Dean', Peter indicates that one of the felicity conditions for promising – namely, that the promisor is able to perform the promised action – is met. In doing this, he externalizes his discourse-constituted *de se* thought that involves presenting oneself as a speaker who is entitled to make this promise. Let us note that Peter had no occurrent thought to that effect before the utterance of (13) had been made. That is to say, the mode of presentation he exploits in forming this thought makes reference to the very speech act that functions as its externalisation.

In making a speech act, then, the speaker foregrounds a relevant role-bound perspective she takes on herself. In doing this, she facilitates the securing of an uptake on the part of her interlocutors by helping them recognize the primary goal and content of her act. Following the Austinian tradition in speech act theory (Austin 1975; Sbisà 2002, 2009, 2013; Witek 2013, 2015a, b, c), we take the securing of uptake to be a necessary condition for the successful performance of illocutionary acts[19]. Therefore, to say that in presenting the role-bound perspective on herself the speaker facilitates the recognition of the goal and content of her utterance is to say that expressing the self in discourse contributes to the successful functioning of its constituent moves.

In sum, *de se* thoughts are distinguished by the roles they play in the cognitive and practical life of a thinking agent. By analogy, a distinctive feature of the discourse-constituted *de se* thought is that its externalisation — i.e., the speaker's corresponding *de se* utterance — performs a specific function in the speech situation the speaker finds herself in. That is to say, foregrounding a certain perspective on herself, the speaker indicates the role she plays in the current speech situation and thereby helps the audience recognise the primary goal and content of her speech act.

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[19] The hearer's uptake plays a key role in the mechanism of interactional negotiation. See Sbisà 2002, 2013; cf. Witek 2015a.

In what follows, we use the conceptual framework of the Austinian speech act theory (Austin 1975; Searle 1969, 1979, 2002; Sbisà 2002, 2009, 2013; Witek 2015a, b, c) to examine a few speech situations involving expressing the self. Our special focus is on different role-bound perspectives that the speakers take on themselves and present using different linguistic and situational strategies. In particular, we discuss discursive factors that seem to be constitutive for the speakers' entitlement or power to perform successful speech acts. In doing this, we set the stage for the discussion of the findings of our questionnaire-based study presented in Table 3 in Section 4. Our hypothesis is that Table 3 suggests a pattern of analysis that can be used to design future studies directed at developing a functional classification of discourse-constituted *de se* thoughts.

Recall that the role-bound perspective the speaker presents in her *de se* utterance has a bearing on how the utterance is to be taken by her interlocutors. In other words, expressing the self in discourse helps to secure uptake on the part of the hearer and thereby facilitates the successful performance of speech acts. To illustrate the functioning of the mechanism in question, let us consider a situation in which Ann wants to talk to John, her husband, about their daughter's school problems. She finds him sitting in their home office and working on a paper. After a few futile efforts to get John involved in a conversation, she utters (14).

(14)   Please stop working and talk to your wife.

Her utterance involves expressing the self. It is instructive to note, however, that the expression by means of which she refers to herself is not the pronominal 'me', but the description 'your wife'. In our view, what motivates Ann's choice of this self-referring expression – which can be regarded as a *functional indexical* (see Jaszczolt, this volume) – is her need to present a certain perspective on herself and thereby to indicate the source of the authority with which her act is made. That is to say, in uttering (14) to refer to herself she exploits and foregrounds a certain normative relationship between her and John: being his wife, she is entitled to expect John to participate in family life. As the corollary of this, Ann's utterance of (14) is a binding directive act – say, a binding demand – and as such brings about John's commitment to take a break and talk to her. To say that the act is binding is to assume — in most cases, tacitly rather than explicitly (see Sbisà 2002) — that it is made with an appropriate authority; in other words, it is to take for granted that the speaker of the act has a certain *illocutionary power*, for instance, the power to perform binding orders or demands on certain issues (cf. Witek 2015: 16). As Sbisà has noted, 'an order issued without authority

may be a rude request, but not [a binding] order' (Sbisà 2002: 423). It is instructive to note, however, that the question whether a certain utterance is a binding illocution of a certain type is independent of the question whether it is a successful perlocutionary act. To answer the former one has to examine whether certain felicity conditions are met (see Austin 1975: 14-15); to answer the latter, by contrast, one has to focus on 'certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons' (Austin 1975: 101). Therefore, it is possible for Ann's utterance of (14) to be successful *qua* an illocutionary act (i.e., to succeed in bringing about John's commitment to take a brake and talk to her) but unsuccessful *qua* a perlocutionary act (i.e., to fail to engender John's cooperative response).

Consider, by contrast, a situation in which Ann, instead of uttering (14), utters (15).

(15)   Please stop working and talk to me.

Let us assume that this utterance is successful *qua* a perlocutionary act, i.e., that John takes a break and starts talking to Ann. Viewed as an illocutionary act, in turn, her utterance of (15) seems to be a firm demand. In our view, however, the commitment Ann creates in uttering (15) is weaker than the one she would have brought about if she had used sentence (14). The crucial difference is that the two self-referring expressions under discussion – i.e., the pronominal 'me' and the description 'your wife' – exploit two different though closely related roles that Ann plays in the interactional event in question: the former exploits and foregrounds the role of the speaker, whereas the latter presents or makes explicit the role of the interlocutor's wife, thereby indicating the source of the authority with which the demand under discussion is made.[20]

In sum, what makes the utterance of (14) a successful or binding demand is the fact that its speaker stands in an appropriate institutional relation to the addressee. The same is true of the illocutionary act made in uttering (13): Peter's words take effect as a binding promise because he is endowed with certain authority or deontic power. For these reasons, to facilitate the successful functioning of their speech acts *qua* illocutionary acts, the speakers of (14) and (13) *foreground the institutional or deontic roles* they play in the speech situations they find themselves in. Now, in analysing the responses to our questionnaire, *nota bene* prepared and distributed to solicit quite a different kind of information, an opportunity will

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[20] For a discussion of the idea of role-exploitation see Korta and Perry 2011.

arise to go further and extend this pattern of analysis — which is, to repeat, in common use in the Austinian tradition in speech act theory (Austin 1975; Searle 1969, 1979, 2002; Sbisà 2002, 2009, 2013; Witek 2013, 2015a) — to encompass cases of dynamically constituted, local roles that entitle speakers to perform certain game-specific speech acts. In other words, we do not want to limit ourselves to examining such clear examples of institutional roles as *being the Faculty Dean* or *being someone's wife*; we believe that the structure of *most, if not all*, speech situations can be described in terms of dynamically constituted, local and situation-specific roles of their participants. We shall return to this idea in Section 4, where we propose a pattern of analysis that can be applied to short talk exchanges involving *de se* utterances.

Now, most of the speech acts on which our discussion is based, and most of our examples in the utilised questionnaire, are assertives. This requires a justification. Our point of departure was the properties of speaker-based generalization ($\pm G$, $\pm S$) and immunity to error through misidentification ($\pm IEM$). From there we proceeded with a question of correlations with devices of a language system. The questionnaire was used to answer this question and, as predicted, it answered it negatively. Had we deliberately introduced another variable in the form of types of speech acts, our study would have been more open to different interpretations. Moreover, the association between, say, a gentle rebuff and an impersonal construction (Polish: 'Nie wolno' – 'one mustn't') or forcefully given order and first-person perlocutionary verb ('Zabraniam ci' – 'I forbid you') is so entrenched, diaphanous and uncontroversial to explain that it hardly justifies an experiment.

Coming back to assertion, since we opted for a speech-act framework and that comes with the recognition of the roles of both the propositional content and the illocutionary goal, the pertinent question to ask here is what it means to assert something. Goldberg (2015: 9-12) lists several options: to assert can mean to express an attitude (à la Bach and Harnish), to add information to common ground (à la Stalnaker), to undertake a commitment (à la Searle, among others), or 'to make a move defined by its constitutive rules' (p. 11, à la Williamson and Goldberg himself). All of these approaches to assertion testify to its importance as an *explanans* for *de se* thoughts. On hearing an assertion, the addressee assumes that what was communicated meets certain agreed standards, and most importantly, that, unless disclaimers are used, what is communicated meets the standards for counting as knowledge and as such being worthy of believing.

In accepting the mutually agreed roles in discourse the interactants tacitly agree on such standards. According to Goldberg (2015: 96), there is a norm of assertion that makes use of an epistemic standard; an assertion is warranted (and proper) when this standard is met as far as the asserted proposition is concerned. This standard is assumed to be mutually manifest to all participants of the conversation:

'It is mutually manifest to participants in a speech exchange that assertion has a robustly epistemic norm; that is, that one must: assert that p, only if E(one,[p]).'

Goldberg (2015: 96),

where 'E' stands for a description of a relevant epistemic standard. Seen in this way, assertions are acts of asserting some content. The choice is now whether to focus on that asserted content as is customary in versions of truth-conditional semantics or Gricean pragmatics, or consider the content and the act of asserting jointly as a unit where the utterance is conditioned by the circumstances in which the act of asserting is performed. Since, as we will demonstrate in Section 4, the choice of the construction used for self-reference depends on various semantic as well as discursive, socio-pragmatic factors associated with its issuance, it seems prudent to opt for the latter. This can be achieved only in those approaches to meaning that take aspects of information conveyed by the context as constitutive parts of the content itself. So, this can be implemented to some extent in presuppositional approaches to indexicals associated with different versions of dynamic semantics referred to earlier in this paper. But bearing in mind the fact that the *de se* perspective permeates not only overt self-reference but also judgements in general in that they are all made, so to speak, 'from the perspective of the judge', we may want to address the question as to what theoretical framework would best allow us to capture this omnipresent '*de se* saturation' of assertion.

To explain, let us take a standard case of a predicate of personal taste in (16).

(16)   Anna: 'Strawberry pavlova is delicious.'

The *de se* perspective is inherent in this assertion and this fact has acquired an extensive discussion in the semantic literature that focuses largely on the debatable need for the hidden

index: 'it tastes delicious *to me*'.[21] But debates over the semantic representation notwithstanding, *de se* perspective is present there also in a different way. (16) is normally an assertion but it can also be, say, primarily an act of request as in (17).

(17)   Anna, finishing the last bit of her dessert and looking greedily at the rest of the cake: 'Strawberry pavlova is delicious.'
The host: 'Would you like some more?'

The *de se* perspective is present in the judgement but also in the implicated request 'I would like some more'. The question is, what kind of meaning do we want to model in our theory of meaning: the primary intended one or the one that is governed by the constraints of the logical form of the uttered sentence, and as such more easily formalizable, albeit not necessarily always reflecting the primary intentions or goals of the speaker? Standard semantic minimalism (e.g. Borg 2004, 2012) and contextualism of the indexicalist (e.g. Stanley 2002) as well as non-indexicalist (e.g. Recanati 2004) variety opt for the grammar-driven meaning, to be represented through standard truth-conditional methods, with varying degrees of pragmatic admixture. Occasionalism (Wittgenstein 1953; Travis 1997, 2008) works on the assumption that all there is is context-driven meaning. A radical post-Gricean theory of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, 2016) sides with occasionalists on the object of study and with Griceans of various orientations on the truth-conditional method: it applies the truth-conditional method to the primary intended content of a speech act. It regards this primary meaning, and as such also the object of study of semantic theory, as orthogonal to the traditional explicit/implicit divide. Now, since, as (16)-(17) illustrate, the *de se* perspective is present in both explicit and implicit communication, and both explicit and implicit content can intentionally lead to the main goal of the speech act, we opt for a contextualist orientation to the representation of meaning, without committing ourselves, for the purpose of this paper, to any particular theory that would capture this content and adequately explain its provenance. To go further would mean to make choices between radical but truth-conditional accounts (and within them contextualist semantic and truth-conditional pragmatic approaches) and, on the other hand, accounts that conflate the treatment of explicit and implicit information, such as radical speech-act-based occasionalist treatments or versions of game theory. We briefly return to this topic in Section 5.

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[21] See e.g. Pearson 2013.

4. Expressing Self-Reference: Evidence from Polish

4.1. The Objectives

In a nutshell, the objective of the study was to test what we can call the Semantic Correlation Thesis (SCT):

(SCT) There are different categories of expressions that are semantically specified for expressing different types or aspects of *de se* thoughts. In other words, there is a conventional correlation between types of expressions used for expressing the self and types or aspects of *de se* thoughts.

We focused here on two parameters discussed in Section 2, namely generalization and IEM. As such, SCT makes reference to abstract aspects of *de se* thoughts. We decided to focus on four different categories of *de se* thoughts that have been constructed using (a) the parameters of self-expression and generalization employed in Moltmann's (2006, 2010a, b) discussions of generalizing detached self-reference (our categories A-C) and (b) IEM (our category D). The types are differentiated along two dimensions: (a) reference to the speaker's own experiences or thoughts or its lack ($\pm$S) and generalization or its lack ($\pm$G), giving us +S–G (category A); +S+G (category B); and –S+G (category C). The $\pm$IEM parameter was used in our Category D where various linguistic expressions were tested for the strength of their correlation with +IEM.

The categories based on $\pm$S and $\pm$G were also used in analysing English (Huang, this volume), French and Thai (Huang, Gréaux and Srioutai, this volume) and constitute part of the experimental design developed as part of the project *Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals* by Huang and Jaszczolt.[22] Types A, B, and C are discussed in detail by Huang (this volume), who provides theoretical and empirical reasons for distinguishing them as different kinds of referential acts. However, it has to be pointed out

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[22] see fn 1 for details. All the questionnaires pertaining to the languages analysed in the project, including the one used here, implemented the Qualtrics survey tool. We thank Minyao Huang for her help with this task.

that in the current study we do not follow the theoretical assumption that they constitute different kinds or types of acts, neither do we employ type –S–G used there.

4.2. The Questionnaire: Design and Data Collection

Each of the four categories presented in Section 4.1 was exemplified by five different texts or dialogues. In categories A-C, some of these were loosely based on those used in Huang (this volume), others were constructed for the purpose. Category D was purpose-designed for this questionnaire. Each text or dialogue contained a choice of four expressions used for self-reference with different degree of generalization. This is where we parted company with the design used for the other studies in the project mentioned above. The latter two tested for a small set of expressions, such as the English *I*, *one*, *you* and the uncontrolled PRO construction, assuming their degree of generalization, and asked the consultants for their judgements as to whether in a given text the speaker was talking about (a) himself/herself; himself/herself and other people like him/her; (c) an average person; or (d) other people. This method strikes us as having a weak point in directly revealing to the consultants the purpose of the study (testing the ±S and ±G dimensions) and as such potentially distorting the results. Instead, we have given the consultants multiple options of *completion of the mini-discourse*, instructing them to select one or more that appear most natural and suitable for the given scenario. Moreover, since Polish employs a relatively wide variety of terms and constructions for self-reference when judged on the dimension of generalization, we were forced to select the four that best suited the scenario without keeping the set constant between the scenarios. The matrix for the questionnaire, that is the questionnaire in the format prior to randomization, can be found on

http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/expressing-the-self/files

Twenty native Polish speakers from the University of Szczecin (Poland) were recruited to participate in the study. They were all first-year students with no background in linguistics. Each participant received 30 PLN for participation.

The participants were sent an online questionnaire, which consisted of a general instruction and twenty reading-comprehension trials. The trials were divided into four equal groups — A, B, C, and D — that corresponded to the four categories of reference discussed in Section 4.1. The trials were randomized with respect to the categories (A-D) as well as

with respect to the degree of generalization initially associated with each of the four expressions or constructions within each of the twenty scenarios (a)-(d).

In each trial the participants were instructed to read a description of a speech situation followed by a list of four alternative utterances equivalent with respect to their general content but different in the strategies — linguistic or situational — they employ for expressing the self. Next, they were asked to select one or more of the utterances as the most appropriate or natural answer or answers in the context of the described speech situation. They were also encouraged to make a short comment (optional) to motivate their responses and explain any difficulties (if there were any) they faced in making their decision.

4.3. The Findings

The summary of the results can be found on
http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/polish_questionnaire_results.pdf
Table 1 presents the number and percentage of responses for types A-C in each category of expression (a)-(d).

Extract	Conceptual category (d)	(a)	(b)	(c)
A1	+S −G / GenNomSgSubj 0 (0%)	1SgSubj 19 (95%)	2SgSubj 0 (0%)	ImpReflSubj 1 (5%)
A2	+S −G / Top 10 (45.45%)	1SgSubj 9 (40.91%)	ImpRefl 1 (4.55%)	Imp 2 (9.09%)
A3	+S −G / ImpSubj 1 (4.17%)	1SgSubj 13 (54.17%)	2SgSubj 5 (20.83%)	GenNomPlSubj 5 (20.83%)
A4	+S −G / Imp 15 (60%)	1Sg 3 (12%)	2Sg 3 (12%)	GenNomSg 4 (16%)
A5	+S −G / Top+Imp 11 (45.83%)	1Sg 11 (45.83%)	2SgSubj 0 (0%)	UQSubj 2 (8.33%)
B1	+S+G / Imp 15 (62.5%)	1Sg 4 (16.67%)	2SgSubj 1 (4.17%)	Imp+GenNomSg 4 (16.67%)
B2	+S+G / Imp 8 (30.77%)	1Pl 0 (0%)	2Sg 17 (65.38%)	GenNomSg 1 (3.85%)
B3	+S+G / Imp 13 (48.15%)	1Sg 11 (40.74%)	2Sg 2 (7.41%)	GenNomSg 1 (3.7%)
B4	+S+G / ImpReflSubj 6 (20.69%)	1SgSubj 13 (44.83%)	2SgSubj 8 (27.59%)	GenNomSgSubj 2 (6.9%)
B5	+S+G / Imp 13 (48.15%)	1Sg 14 (51.85%)	2Sg 0 (0%)	ImpRefl 0 (0%)
C1	−S+G / ImpSubj 12 (52.17%)	2SgSubj 0 (0%)	ImpReflSubj 9 (39.13%)	GenNomSgSubj 2 (8.7%)
C2	−S+G / GenNomSg 7 (31.82%)	1Pl 10 (45.45%)	2Sg 2 (9.09%)	ImpRefl 3 (13.64%)
C3	−S+G / Imp 7 (22.58%)	1Pl 8 (25.81%)	2Sg 12 (38.71%)	GenNomSg 4 (12.9%)
C4	−S+G / Imp 5 (19.23%)	1Pl 3 (11.54%)	2Sg 6 (23.08%)	GenNomSg 12 (46.15%)
C5	−S+G / Top+Hedge 9 (40.91%)	1Pl 1 (4.55%)	ImpRefl 9 (40.91%)	ImpPPle 3 (13.64%)

Column header note: Type of expression, number (and percentage) of responses

Table 1. Consultants' choices in categories +S−G, +S+G and −S+G[23]

[23] Key to abbreviations used in Tables 1 and 2. Please note that we merely list the relevant grammatical and semantic features of the expressions rather than providing an exhaustive description.

+S/-S	expressing/not expressing speaker's perspective
+G/-G	expressing/not expressing speaker-based generalization
+IEM	a construction displaying immunity to error through misidentification
1/2	first/second person
Acc	accusative case
BP	bare proposition
Dat	dative case
Evid	evidential expression
Form	formulaic expression
Gen	generic form
Hedge	hedging expression
Imp	impersonal form
Nom	nominal expression
Poss	possessive pronoun
PPle	past participle form
Refl	reflexive form
Sg/Pl	singular/plural number (nominative case unless otherwise stated)
Subj	subjunctive
Top	topicalization
UQ	universal quantifier expression
V	verb

Table 2 presents the numbers and percentages of responses for category D in each category of expression (a)-(d).

Extract	Conceptual category	Type of expression, number (and percentage) of responses			
		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
D1	+S +IEM	Top+1SgAcc 20 (74.07%)	Top+1SgDat 3 (11.11%)	1Sg+*have*+Nom 3 (11.11%)	1Sg+V+Nom 1 (3.7%)
D2	+S +IEM	1Sg+PPle 2 (7.41%)	1Sg+*have*+Nom+PPle 7 (25.93%)	Top+1SgAcc 11 (40.74%)	1SgPoss+Nom+PPle 7 (25.93%)
D3	+S +IEM	1Sg 13 (40.63%)	ReflEvid+1SgDat 13 (40.63%)	ImpReflEvid 0 (0%)	BP+Hedge 6 (18.75%)
D4	+S +IEM	1Sg 2 (5.71%)	ReflEvid+1SgDat 7 (20%)	BP+Hedge 14 (40%)	ImpForm 12 (34.29%)
D5	+S +IEM	1Sg 11 (29.73%)	Top 11 (29.73%)	Top+Imp 9 (24.32%)	Imp 6 (16.22%)

Table 2. Consultants' choices in category +S +IEM

Note that because the consultants were allowed to choose more than one answer, the total number of responses can exceed the number of respondents and the result given in real numbers does not bear a steady correlation with the result given in percentages. In other words, five responses from the total of twenty consultants need not mean twenty five per cent.

4.4. Discussion

As the tables demonstrate, there does not seem to be any discernible correlation between types of expressions and the parameters of *de se* thoughts expressed that would justify further qualitative analysis. We found no patterns that would suggest a correlation between types of expressions relevant for the situations in our scenario and aspects of *de se* thought investigated here. In other words, SCT was not confirmed. This was as predicted and agrees with the evidence and theoretical argumentation advanced in Section 2. However, the results appear to fit well with the speech-act based account of expressing *de se* thoughts that we began to put forward in Section 3 as a feasible alternative. If there are correlations, they

appear to be with acts of communication, intentions, goals, needs to foreground certain bits of information, at the same time conforming to conventions. In our view, the distribution of the responses and the way some of the consultants commented on and motivated their choices suggest a pattern of a speech-act based analysis of *de se* utterances. The pattern is implemented in Table 3, which identifies the speech situation the speaker finds herself in (column 2), describes the conversational move she makes (column 3), identifies the primary goal behind the move (column 4), shows the distribution of the responses made by the consultants (column 6), presents their selected comments (column 6), and describes the discourse-constituted aspect of the self externalised for the sake of the successful performance of the speaker's act (column 7).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Extract	Speech situation	Description of the relevant move	Primary goal of the relevant move	**Distribution of responses** Type of expression / number of responses / percentage of responses (prominent choices are	**Selected comments by the consultants** (only for the prominent choices)	Externalised, discourse-constituted aspect of the self
A1	Interview with a rock singer	Acknowledgement and concession	Explaining the situation the speaker finds herself in as normal	**1SgSubj / 19 / 95%** 2SgSubj / 0 / 0% ImpReflSubj / 1 / 5% GenNomSgSubj / 0 / 0%	**1SgSubj**: — The singer is expressing his own opinion. — In this case the singer is supposed to speak for himself. — The singer is invited to express his personal feelings. — It is a subjective opinion.	A person whose experience provides grounds for the proposed explanation
A2	Film review in a specialist magazine	Making an evaluative judgement	Making a subjective though professional judgement	**1SgSubj / 9 / 40.91%** ImpRefl / 1 / 4.55% Imp / 2 / 9.09% **Top / 10 / 45.45%**	**1SgSubj**: — The expression 'dałbym' ('I would give') signals subjectivity that characterises expressing one's own opinion. — The critic presents the reviewers' subjective opinion, which should be formulated in the first person. — The critic's subjective judgement. — The critic is supposed to present her subjective point of view. **Top**: — An attempt to soften a very critical opinion. — The expression 'to przedsięwzięcie' ('this enterprise') is convincing in this utterance.	A professional who is writing in the capacity of a critic
A3	Fragment of a novel	Making a general point about one's own situation	Complaint about one's own life situation	**1SgSubj / 3 / 54.17%** 2SgSubj / 5 / 20.83% GenNomPlSubj / 5 / 20.83% ImpSubj / 1 / 4.17%	**1SgSubj**: — The first-person form links the utterance at issue with the previous one. — It is the best way to continue the novel that that starts with a sentence in the first person. — If the speaker uses the first person form in the opening utterance, he should continue it in the second one. — It is a first-person narration. — An ideal conclusion of an internal monologue. — It is the only utterance that is in the first person. — The speaker is describing his own feelings.	An author whose feelings provide grounds for the proposed general point
A4	TV interview with a famous film director	Answering a question	Giving personal though professional advice	1Sg / 3 / 12% 2Sg / 3 / 12% GenNomSg / 4 / 16% **Imp / 15 / 60%**	**Imp**: — The reporter's opening question concerns the character traits that allow one to become a good film director, not the traits that allowed this particular person to become a good director. — Implicit advice for other how to achieve such a success. — The director explains his secret [recipe] that everyone can followed.	A professional whose experience entitles her to give advice on the matters at issue

					— The most general answer. It does not specify who is a good director, but states which character traits help one to become a good director. — This sentence expresses the director's conjecture.	
A5	Interview with a football player	Making an expressive act (criticism and shame)	Expressing the speaker's own critical opinion	**1Sg / 11 / 45.83%** 2SgSubj / 0 / 0% UQSubj / 2 / 8.33% **Top+Imp / 11 / 45.83%**	**1Sg**: — The player expresses his own subjective opinion. — The player is speaking of his own feelings towards the coach. — This utterance is an expression of one's own opinion. **Top+Imp**: — Every speaker is supposed to react quickly; [that's why] the sentence has no verb. — It is the most lenient way to express a [critical] opinion on one's "boss". **1Sg & Top+Imp**: — I take these two responses to be direct expressions of the speaker's own opinion. — These two utterances expresses the player's personal opinion.	A professional whose personal experience in working with the superior grounds the expressed opinion
B1	Radio broadcast	Making an expressive act (disbelief)	Presenting the fact at issue as surprising to the speaker and the audience	1Sg / 4 / 16.67% 2SgSubj / 1 / 4.17% Imp+GenNomSg / 4 / 16.67% **Imp / 15 / 62.5%**	**Imp**: — It sounds like an utterance made by a radio reporter. — The radio reporter is supposed to speak general, not personally. — This utterance communicates the fact that it is difficult to believe something without communicating who finds it difficult to believe it. — Unlike the other three options, this utterance, is appropriate in the context of a radio broadcast. — The other options are too informal for a radio reporter.	A professional whose surprise is expressed and likely to be shared by others
B2	Advertisement	Offering an encouraging description	Marketing for sales, tempting	1Pl / 0 / 0% **2Sg / 17 / 65.38%** GenNomSg / 1 / 3.85% Imp / 8 / 30.77%	**2Sg**: — When I hear that it is ME who doesn't have to do it, I feel as if I was there. — Sentences used in advertisements are usually formed in the second-person singular form. — The advertisement seems to be addressed to one particular person, i.e., to the reader. — This sentence matches the language of advertisements: it addresses the reader in a positive tone. — It sounds naturally because it directly addresses the receiver.	A professional whose job is persuading others. Projected self: a person who would enjoy the situation at issue and is like the addressee in the relevant respects
B3	Argumentative dialogue	Elaboration (following explanation)	Supporting one's previously expressed opinion	**1Sg / 11 / 40.74%** 2Sg / 2 / 7.41% GenNomSg / 1 / 3.7% **Imp / 13 / 48.15%**	**1Sg**: — The speaker has been asked to express his subjective opinion. — The speaker is supposed to speak for himself. — The question that the	A professional making judgement in his/her professional capacity.

					speaker answer to is addressed directly to him. — The speaker expresses his opinion in the most natural way possible. **Imp**: — Simple answer that explains everything. — It is the most natural option.	
B4	Talk about a mutual friend	Contrast	Presenting the fact at issue as surprising to the speaker and the audience	**1SgSubj / 13 / 44.83%** **2SgSubj / 8 / 27.59%** GenNomSgSubj / 2 / 6.9% ImpReflSubj / 6 / 20.69%	**1SgSubj**: — The speaker is expressing his subjective opinion. — Nobody expected that Tomek would be capable of doing it. — The speaker expresses his own opinion. **2SgSubj**: — 'Rozmawiając' ('talking (to him)' and nie pomyślałbyś' ('you wouldn't think') often collocate with each other. — In saying this the speaker shows that it would be really difficult to find it out on one's own. — It is a dialogue between friends; in this context the form 'nie pomyślałbyś' is the most adequate strategy to address one's interlocutor.	A speaker whose surprise is expressed and whose surprise is likely to be shared by other people
B5	Argumentative dialogue	Explanation	Supporting one's previously expressed opinion in response to the opponent's challenge	**1Sg / 14 / 51.85%** 2Sg / 0 / 0% ImpRefl / 0 / 0% **Imp / 13 / 48.15%**	**1Sg**: — If Ann asked the opening question, she could not hear the train announcements. That's why the first person response is natural. — The opening question is 'Skąd wiesz?' ['How do you know?'], hence the answer should concern the responding speaker. — The first-person answer matches the second-person question. **Imp**: — This is how I speak.	A speaker who is an average experiencer
C1	Comment on a crime reported in a newspaper	Considering a possible explanation and contrast	Presenting and undermining a possible hypothesis	2SgSubj / 0 / 0% **ImpReflSubj / 9 / 39.13%** GenNomSgSubj / 2 / 8.7% **ImpSubj / 12 / 52.17%**	**ImpSubj**: — This form sounds naturally in this situation. — It seems to be the most probable response. **ImpReflSubj** & **ImpSubj**: — Both options sound naturally. — From the speaker's perspective it is possible to think that the teenager committed the crime for many, but the actual motive is unknown.	A speaker who, in virtue of his/her general knowledge, is able to predict but not necessarily share other people's perspective (a generalization that can, but do not have to apply to the speaker)
C2	Weather forecast	Making an informative statement and contrast	Conveying to the viewers that, contrary to their presumed expectations, an event/state is going to	**1Pl / 10 / 45.45%** 2Sg / 2 / 9.09% ImpRefl / 3 / 13.64% **GenNomSg / 7 / 31.82%**	**1Pl**: — This form is characteristic of utterances made by weather forecast presenters. — Addressing the viewer, showing that one is close to him or her. — The TV weather forecast suggests that [the stated	A professional who, in virtue of his/her general knowledge, is able to simulate but not

		occur		regularity] concerns all of us, including the TV presenter. — The speaker identifies herself or himself with the viewers. The utterance suggests that we all hoped that the heatwave was over. **GenNomSg**: [no comments].	necessarily share other people's expectations
C3	A journal headline	Making a general statement about common goals	Advising	1Pl / 8 / 25.81% **2Sg / 12 / 38.71%** GenNomSg / 4 / 12.9% Imp / 7 / 22.58%	**2Sg**: — Directly addressing the reader is a frequent strategy used in magazines to build the atmosphere of being in direct contact with the reader. — You too can look after yourself, it is so simple! — The most accurate heading that directly addresses the reader, not the general audience. — Headlines often address the readers directly. — This headline is the most encouraging one.	An author who, in virtue of his/her professional knowledge, is able to make a second-person oriented generalisation
C4	Talk about a mutual friend	Making a critical statement	Suggesting responsibility and criticsm; blame	1Pl / 3 / 11.54% 2Sg / 6 / 23.08% **GenNomSg / 12 / 46.15%** Imp / 5 / 19.23%	**GenNomSg**: — The aim of this utterance is to express a worldly common truth. — The speaker makes a comment on her friend's habits, but do not want to refer explicitly to her. — It is the most accurate way to refer to a third person who does not participate in the conversation. — The speaker wants to talk about an absent person.	A speaker who, in virtue of his/her general knowledge, is able to make a third-person oriented generalisation
C5	Product information	Concession and information	Presenting a common opinion without taking full responsibility for its truth	1Pl / 1 / 4.55% **ImpRefl / 9 / 40.91%** ImpPPle / 3 / 13.64% **Top+Hedge / 9 / 40.91%**	**ImpRefl**: — The form 'przyjmuje się' ('it is generally accepted') makes the whole message more credible. **Top+Hedge**: — I construe this utterance as an advertisement. — It sounds naturally and is likely to succeed in encouraging the hearers to buy the product at issue.	A speaker who knows but not necessarily shares a common opinion
D1	Small talk	Making an expressive act	Expressing one's feeling	**Top+1SgAcc / 20 / 74.07%** Top+1SgDat / 3 / 11.11% 1Sg+*have*+Nom / 3 / 11.11% 1Sg+V+Nom / 1 / 3.7%	**Top+1SgAcc**: — I would say it that way. — Simple and honest answer. — Short and common saying. — It is the most 'chilled' answer that can occur in a friendly talk. — It is the quickest answer. Other options sound unnatural in the context of a friendly talk. — It is the most natural answer.	A speaker whose own feelings are directly expressed
D2	Explanation-seeking talk	Explanation	Explaining one's own behaviour	1Sg+PPle / 2 / 7.41% 1Sg+*have*+Nom+PPle / 7 / 25.93% 1SgPoss+Nom+PPle / 7 / 25.93% **Top+1SgAcc / 11 / 40.74%**	**Top+1SgAcc**: — It is a quick and short answer typical for a spoken language. — A quick and concise answer characteristic for informal talks between friends. — Short questions invite	A speaker on his/her bodily experience

					short answers.	
D3	Advice-seeking talk	Expressing one's opinion	Advising one's interlocutor	**1Sg / 13 / 40.63%** **ReflEvid+1SgDat / 13 / 40.63%** ImpReflEvid / 0 / 0% BP+Hedge / 6 / 18.75%	**1Sg**: — The speaker expresses his own opinion about the suggestion at issue. **1Sg** & **ReflEvid+1SgDat**: — Expressing one's subjective opinion. — Bartek is expressing his own opinion. — These two utterances are good answers to the opening question.	A speaker who expresses his/her personal opinion and thereby gives the interlocutor a piece of personal advice
D4	Small talk	Making a prediction	Making a weather prediction based on one's intuitions	1Sg / 2 / 5.71% ReflEvid+1SgDat / 7 / 20% **BP+Hedge / 14 / 40%** **ImpForm / 12 / 34.29%**	**BP+Hedge**: — Other forms are not used. This one sounds natural. — The first form that comes to my mind. **ImpForm**: — This form seems to be the most natural, because Bartek infers from his own observation.	A speaker whose intuitions provide basis for the expressed prediction
D5	Small talk	Making an expressive act	Expressing one's subjective taste	**1Sg / 11 / 29.73%** **Top / 11 / 29.73%** Top+Imp / 9 / 24.32% Imp / 6 / 16.22%	**1Sg**: — This utterance expresses the speaker's [culinary] tastes. **Top**: — This response has the most natural form that matches both a talk between friend and a conversation between two women who do not each other. — This response sounds natural, especially in the context of a conversation between friends. **1Sg** & **Top**: — It is one's own subjective opinion.	A speaker whose personal taste is being expressed

Table 3. Distribution of responses annotated for situations, moves, goals, and expressed aspects of the self

At this point we have to repeat our earlier disclaimer, namely that the study originated as an inquiry into a putative correlation between forms of self-reference and generalizing self-reference on the one hand, and the property of IEM on the other. So, any conclusions we draw that go beyond this original inquiry are an extra bonus and as such still tentative, in that they are merely observations from a questionnaire that was originally designed for testing SCT. Specifically, the influence of speech acts, with their associated speaker intentions and moves, is an additional bonus that we have been flagging throughout this essay and that will require a separate purpose-designed empirical study as a follow-up. For now, scrutinising the table, what we can observe pertains merely to exemplifications of an uncontrolled sample of speech acts, and in addition, with the exception of assertion, in a single or scarce occurrence.

With this in mind, we observe that first-person forms are used for expressing one's opinion (A1, A3), with an admixture of topicalized constructions when a professional opinion is expressed on the basis of endowed or agreed authority (A2, A5). Professional assessment can also trigger impersonal constructions when presented as objective or likely to be shared (B3), and even more typically when offering authority-based advice (A4). Expressing personal but sharable experience triggers a similar pattern (B5). Similarly, a radio broadcast with an expression of personal but commonly held view based on objective data triggers mostly an impersonal construction (B1), and when based on common expectations shared with the audience, a first-person plural (inclusive 'we') form or a generic use of 'man' ('człowiek', C2). Advice expressed as common, shared goals also triggers an inclusive 'we' construction (C3), and so does advertising, where the strategy of including the addressees in the advertised holiday scenario is used in marketing (B2), while presenting product information from a disputable source triggers an impersonal reflexive, or, when taken to be the act of advertising, topicalization and hedging (C5). Next, the combination of asserting contrast and expressing surprise triggers first-person subjunctive and to a lesser extent second-person subjunctive (B4). Considering possible explanations is also detached through the use of the subjunctive but this time associated with one of the impersonal constructions available in Polish (C1). Polite blame is expressed mostly through a generic 'man' (C4). Finally, the +S +IEM scenarios trigger highly conventionalized constructions for standard expressions of one's sensations and feelings, mostly with topicalization and first-person accusative form ('The head aches to me', D1, D2) or, when referring to one's epistemic states, the forms 'I think' or 'it seems to me that' (D3). When founded on observable data, impersonal statements are often issued, some of them hedged (D4). Personal tastes are

expressed in our questionnaire in first-person singular form or, more emphatically, through topicalization (D5). To repeat, these are based on single instances of speech situations tested on only 20 consultants and are further constrained by the authors' own pre-selection of four most natural sounding expressions that would fit the situation. For this reason we are merely flagging the interesting association between speech situations and constructions, without extending it to a full quantitative analysis.

The pattern exemplified by Table 3 results from applying a general analytic strategy used in Austinian models of illocutionary interaction (Austin 1975; Searle 1969, 1979, 2002; Sbisà 2002, 2009, 2013; Witek 2013, 2015a) to examples of *de se* utterances in the utilised questionnaire. Roughly speaking, the strategy starts with defining the conversational move made by the speaker in terms of (a) its primary goal — e.g., its conventional effect (Austin 1975), it illocutionary point (Searle 1979), its normative effect (Sbisà 2002, 2009, 2013; cf. Witek 2013, 2015c) or the response or the sequel it invites (Witek 2015b) — and, next, goes to accounting for its felicitous performance by reference to (b) the role the speaker plays in the speech situation she finds herself in and (c) the strategy she uses to secure the uptake on the part of the audience, i.e., the lexical, grammatical, and contextual means she employs to indicate or signal the force and content of her utterance.

In other words, various discursive strategies result in a role-bound perspective the speaker adopts. The labels we utilised are still largely descriptive. A generalization over such moves, goals and aspects of the self as well as a possible model will have to be left to a separate project and will require a suitable theoretic framework such a version of game-theoretic semantics (see e.g. Parikh 2010 on Equilibrium Semantics) or other goal-based speech-act model (see e.g. Goodman and Stuhlmüller 2013 on rational speech act theory of language understanding).

We assume that there are at least two types of strategies that the speaker can use to present the role-bound perspective she takes on herself and thereby to facilitate the securing of uptake on the part of the audience: lexical and situational. In most cases, the lexical strategy adopted by the speaker comes down to using the first-person pronominal forms. The situational strategies adopted by speakers, in turn, exploit the contextual salience of their discursive roles, e.g., the role of a film critic in A2, the role of an experienced film director in A4, the role of a speaker who writes in the capacity of a health expert in C3, and so forth. In some cases the speaker's role is made salient by the rhetorical structure of the dialogue she participates in: the speaker in B5 presents herself as a proponent of the challenged claim, in D1 the speaker responds to the invitation to say how she is feeling, and in D3 the speaker

responds to the invitation to give a piece of personal advice. What these cases have in common is that they all involve *foregrounding role-bound aspects of the self*. In other words, every speech situation analysed in Table 3 involves a speaker who presents a certain discourse-constituted perspective on herself so as to help the audience recognize the primary goal behind her illocutionary act and thereby facilitate its successful performance.

In short, following our preliminary empirical study, we are inclined to reject SCT in favour of a speech act based model along the lines indicated Table 3. To repeat, in our view, the analysis it presents suggests that the choice of strategy for expressing the self has little to do with the abstract types or aspects of *de se* thought and with any corresponding typologies of acts of reference advanced in the literature. Rather, it depends on various discourse-internal factors and is motivated by the need to facilitate the securing of uptake on the part of the audience. Even though the distinction between the four types of reference under discussion is theoretically motivated and conceptually clear, the corresponding classification of abstract types of *de se* thoughts seems to be of little help in understanding the discursive mechanisms of expressing the self. All there is is a speech act performed in certain circumstances by a speaker who plays a certain discourse-constituted role in the speech situation she finds herself in. In other words again, what motivates the speaker's choice of strategy for expressing the self is neither the type nor degree of her *de se* thought, but the need to facilitate the successful performance of her speech act.

In our view, the analytic pattern implemented in Table 3 can help us design future theoretical and empirical studies directed at developing a speech-act based classification of types of *de se* thoughts and aspects of the self that are expressed and foregrounded in discourse. Paraphrasing Austin's condition A.1 (see Austin 1975: 14), we can take each row of Table 3 to describe an accepted local procedure having a certain effect, i.e. the effect that is represented by the primary goal behind the relevant conversational move. That procedure is to include the use of a certain strategy for expressing the self by a speaker endowed with certain discourse-constituted roles and powers. In addition, we believe that the structure of most, if not all, speech situations can be described in terms of, as Sbisà (2002) suggests, commonly agreed local procedures that dynamically determine roles of speakers and thereby put constraints on the scope of the conversational moves they can felicitously make. Such commonly agreed procedures also incorporate conventions that would have to be accounted for in the model. In saying that the roles are dynamically constituted we do not rule out the

possibility that they can reoccur; quite the opposite: what makes the procedures and roles conventional is that they are reproduced by following agreed precedents.[24]

5. Concluding Remarks: *De Se* Thoughts and Speech Acts

Perry (e.g. 2012: 88) identifies three kinds of self-knowledge: (i) *de re* about oneself; (ii) *de se* that results from identifying an idea of the person (Perry's 'notion') as the self; and (iii) *de se* from the perspective of the self. In the latter case there is no need for a notion or a representation of the self. The notion of the self gets constructed during life experiences (through so-called 'buffers'), it stabilises, and generates information about the self (epistemic role) and actions (pragmatic role). We are interested here only in (ii) and (iii). As Perry observes, both can exhibit IEM: (ii) conditionally and (iii) essentially. Further, his proposal of notions and buffers also suggests that we form notions of ourselves through buffers that stay with us once they are acknowledged. There are attributes that slowly build the concept of the self. There is no category-driven gradation here that would allow one to suggest degrees of *de-se*-ness, so to speak. Neither are there types of *de se*-ness.

Our speech-act based analysis takes the explanation of *de se* thought a bit further in virtue of its linguistic slant. The speaker, and thereby the owner of the underlying *de se* thought, focuses on different aspects of the self in different speech acts because he/she wishes to present a relevant perspective on the self and lead to different actions resulting from this presentation (cf. Perry's epistemic and pragmatic roles; see also Christofaki, this volume). It appears that it is not enough to say that stable notions are formed without recognising what Slobin (1996) aptly calls 'thinking for speaking': there is a *de se* thought when we want to preserve public self-image in a political speech, and there is a different *de se* thought when we feel guilty about boasting afterwards. There is one *de se* thought when a parent scolds a child in order to teach him good manners and a different and often co-temporal *de se* thought when a parent feels sorry for the ignorant toddler. These thoughts are not just separate *de se* thoughts; they correspond to aspects of the same language game and as such the generalized aspects of the self that are foregrounded in them can constitute the *parameters* for a successful classification in terms of moves, goals and strategies.

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[24] For a discussion of the idea of local and situation-specific patterns of illocutionary interaction see Witek 2015b, c.

The next question is what theories of communication are fit for the task of modelling such *de se* communicative acts. For example, as we suggested above, a game-based account of communication seems to be a natural framework in which a speech-act-based picture of the self can find a home. This is a proposal with a long and noble tradition (Lewis 1979b; Barwise and Perry 1983; more recently e.g. Parikh 2010) and with a promising future in that it breaks away with what Parikh (2010: 123) aptly calls 'the mainstream pipeline view of meaning' where 'semantics first yields an *underspecified*, context-free, and conventional content that is subsequently filled in contextually by pragmatics.' This rejected view is synonymous with what he calls the post-Gricean 'imbricated picture of meaning' (Parikh 2010: 5) where what is said or explicit is not awarded the same treatment as what is implicit, contrary to evidence we have from the role indirect speech acts play in discourse. But, as we indicated in Chapter 3, for the purpose of this discussion, suffice it to say that once we have established the utility of speech acts for analysing *de se* expression and *de se* thought, the door remains open for any radical contextualist account of meaning, provided it goes all the way to representing the main intended content irrespective of its status as explicit or implicit – or irrespective of its relation to the logical form of the uttered sentence. After all, as we emphasised throughout Sections 2 and 3, the sentence, and the devices of the language system at large, are only part of the tools that interactants use to express their intentions and attain their conversational goals. This theory could be game-theoretic, or it could be post-Gricean, where Equilibrium Semantics (Parikh 2010) falls in one camp and Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010) in the other.[25] Such accounts are perfectly capable of accommodating the observation, demonstrated through the questionnaire-based study in Section 4, that the devices of the language system are not a way to answer the question of what aspects of *de se* thoughts are being externalized.

Now, it is common in literary fiction to portray protagonists as embarking on a life journey that affords them a deeper understanding of themselves. Many literary works in various traditions, from historical novels where the individual's self-awareness increases as momentous historical events take place, to stream of consciousness where the individual's states of mind are attended to, so to speak, 'from within', testify to what we could call the increase of self-awareness. Sometimes this self-awareness is depicted as acquiring a different

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[25] For a useful comparison see Parikh 2016.

sense of the self.[26] But there is a long way from literary fiction or metaphorically expressed self-criticism of the type exemplified in (18) to demonstrating that different ways of expressing the self correlate with different understandings of the self. They do not; instead, they correlate with the speech act in which they are involved and with the purpose at hand.

(18)   I can't believe it was me who said these words.

In sum, we have argued here that the solution to the question of the linguistic expression of beliefs *de se* lies in an in-depth investigation into the properties of acts of communication. Within this standpoint, we have also addressed the question of further characteristics of *de se*, focusing on such phenomena as generalization through the use of generic *one* and its near-equivalents, as well as immunity to error through misidentification. Using theoretical arguments, extant evidence from different languages, as well as our own empirical data from Polish collected through a purpose-designed questionnaire, we concluded that it would be a mistake to attempt qualitative distinctions within linguistic devices used for reference *de se* founded on a correlation between types of expressions and aspects of *de se* thought. In other words, it is not the case that, say, pure self-awareness calls for a reference through first-person pronoun while a polite generalization of the type 'if I were you I would…' for generic *one*, generic *you* in English, generic *człowiek* or an impersonal reflexive in Polish.[27] Motivations for using this wide array of available forms and expressions are ample and can only be properly explained when we focus on speech act types, speech act roles, and the associated socio-pragmatic facilitators such as the standards of politeness, subsuming conventions associated with a setting and purpose, and so forth. In short, neither *de se* thoughts nor *de se* expressions fall into distinct categories, and there is no interesting thought-expression correlation. At most there are aspects of *de se* foregrounded for the speech act at hand.

    And yet, committed linguistic relativists try to pin any different senses of the self on the natural language systems:

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[26] In the first category we could place for example Tolstoy's *War and Peace* or on the symbolic level Dante Alighieri's *The Divine Comedy*; in the latter, Proust's *Remembrance of the Times Past*. Examples are ample as the *de se* perspective lies in the very core of literary fiction.

[27] See also Aikhenvald, this volume on the cross-linguistic phenomenon of the use of generics for first-person reference.

'What sort of beings we take ourselves to be in [the] ontological or metaphysical sense will depend on the grammar of our language. Here we do have a stronger Whorfian effect. We shall try to show that there are distinctive senses of self identifiable in diverse cultures with languages that differ in just the dimensions of indexicality of the first person, and the grammatical models that would tempt one into a superficial reading of the first person.'   Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 18).

Language is understood there in the Sapirian way as a self-contained symbolic system and with it comes the relativists' assumption that a symbolic system exhausts the means of forming and externalising thoughts. The problem with founding the entire methodology on such an assumption stares us in the eye in that the very central component of linguistic communication, namely communication through pragmatic inference and conventions, is excluded here from the start. It is not a revelation that languages differ in their pronominal systems or in the systems of grammatical distinctions. But neither is it a revelation that what lexicon or grammar achieve in communication in one language, pragmatics can achieve in another. The speech-act perspective offered in this paper helps us see that a functional, intention- and goal-based analysis not only puts the tools offered in the language system in the correct perspective but also engulfs them as one of many vehicles through which we externalise thoughts – specifically *de se* thoughts as well as all other, necessarily *trans se*, thoughts alike.[28]

Two options are open at this juncture. We can side with occasionalists and conclude that the particular act of communication dictates what kind of *de se* expression to use and since the reasons are ample (intentions, goals, conventions, semantic content), the discussion has to end with this descriptive statement. Or we can assume that the *de se* perspective, and often the particular *de se* expression with its meaning acquired in the given context, contribute to the semantic representation of the utterance and attempt a formal analysis. But this is a topic for yet another separate discussion.

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[28] We refer here to Cappelen and Dever's (2013) observation that the first-person perspective necessarily permeates all human experience and thoughts and as a result indexicality is all-pervasive in linguistic utterances at large.

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